

When asked an open-ended question, the same triad that was singled out amongst alternatives offered is emerging at the top of the list. However, the concerns about social services, especially health, and concerns about everything to do with natural resources, also appear prominently on the list. Compared to the 2000 Cambodia diagnostic survey, the role of the police is perceived as being even more negative, and health also moves up.

Respondents' background influences answer patterns in ways by now familiar (see table 30A, Annex V).


- The Ministry of Interior, i.e. the police, is mentioned more often by rural Cambodians;
- Justice, i.e. the courts, bothers urban Cambodians most;
- Education is mentioned more often by urban than by rural Cambodians;
- The higher educated and the better off socio-economically the respondents the more often they mention justice and MEF.

When compared cross-nationally, with the 2000 Thai data, what stands out most are less the similarities (police, revenue generation and natural resources management most corrupt), than the differences. Unlike the Cambodian evaluation, the Thai respondents rate two important pillars of good governance, the (ultimate) guardians of the rule of law and the providers of basic services *positive* rather than negative.

The relationship between assessment of service quality and the perceived institutional integrity

When we compare the ratings for quality of Service (table 9) for various institutions with the ratings for integrity (table 29) it is very obvious that there is a strong correlation between both ratings. The figure 1 below visualizes the relationship.

Correlation between Service quality rating and Integrity rating



Where and how to take action?

We included one more question on the sectors considered most important by citizens: *if you were in a position of authority and you could do something about corruption in Cambodia, which corruption/corruption in which sector would you target first?* A triad of familiar sectors tops the list -courts, the police and MEF - and in line with the other answer patterns, natural resources management (MAFF) and the two basic social services, health and education among those mentioned regularly. The only new entrants here are local authorities – in line with their rating as one of the more dishonest institutions – and the anti-trafficking unit, which can probably be interpreted as a specification of law enforcement and thus part of the Ministry of Interior, police/military cluster.

Table 31: However one phrases the question, the police, the courts and those ‘in charge of the money’ are seen as the most corrupt parts the national government II

N=1600, 2875 answers	Percentage of cases
Courts/ Judges	39%
Ministry of Justice	3%
Police/ Military	34%
Ministry of Interior	4%
Women/ Drug trafficking-unit	8%
Ministry of Economy and finance	30%
Ministry of Agriculture, Wildlife and Fisheries	15%
Ministry of Health	14%
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports	7%
Local authorities (Village / commune chief.....)	10%
Others	22%

We also asked an open-ended question with two answers allowed about priority actions to take in the fight against corruption: *if you were in a position of authority and you could do something about corruption in Cambodia, what action would you take first and what would you do next?*

Table 32: The first priority action against corruption is to rid the administration of corrupt officials

N=2350	Percentage of cases
Change/Dismiss/Jail corrupt officials	71%
Change of leadership in the government	10%
Enforcement of the (Corruption) law	42%
Issue a corruption law	21%
Provision of higher salary for civil servants	11%
Others	9%

A minority of Cambodians is aware that targeted legal means to deal with corruption are not yet in place and define adopting an anti-corruption law as their priority. A large majority declares immediate drastic action their priority: getting rid of corrupt officials, through enforcement of whatever law is appropriate and/or effective, and some want to start at the highest level (change of leadership).

The often heard solution of increasing salaries is only mentioned by a good 10% of respondents as the way forward. This might be read as another indicator of decreasing acceptance of corrupt practices.

CORRUPTION IN RECRUITMENT TO THE CIVIL SERVICE

We explored respondents' experiences with job applications. *Did you or anyone else in your household apply for a job in a government office in the last five years?* This is not an issue that one may expect reasonably accurate answers for. There are too many possible biases that can play into answering a question like this.²⁸ We nevertheless opted to include a question on the issue because of the intriguing finding of the 2000 WB diagnostic that the 5% of the respondents in their civil servants survey who admitted to this practice existing in Cambodia estimated it occurred on average in only 7% of all recruitments to public jobs.

Only 31 of our respondents reported that one or more HH members applied for a job in a government office. In total that resulted in 37 job application cases. Respondents claimed that in 23 out of those 37 the applicant was asked for money (62%). About half of the applications were for teaching jobs. Two thirds of these were reported to have involved a request for payment. The numbers here are way too low to be representative and thus conclusions can only be very speculative. But however one interprets it, the finding certainly does not support the assessment of the year 2000 civil servant respondents whose depiction of recruitment reality was paraphrased as '[the] practice is rare but not unheard of'.

²⁸ Those who have applied, paid and gotten a job will not be very eager to admit to that. Those who did apply and did not get a job might opt for a face saving strategy of claiming they were rejected because of not paying.

IMPACT AT HOUSEHOLD LEVEL

To explore the impact of corruption at household level we included a relatively elaborate battery of expenditure questions. *Food* expenditure was requested for the last week (and multiplied by 52). *Non-food* expenses that one makes regularly (fuel, personal care, transportation, etc.) were noted down for the past month (and multiplied by 12), and occasional expenses were noted down for last year, to be aggregated into a yearly total household expenditure figure. Both the monthly and the yearly Non-food expenses contained expenditure items that are corruption prone and thus impact the household economy. Most of these are *services* in the common sense of the term: utilities (monthly), regular educational expenses (monthly), occasional educational expenses, health care, registration and licensing (public registry, business licensing, land administration, construction permits, all yearly). Some are government services in a broader sense of the term (police, courts, and customs, all yearly). For the sake of brevity, these are all called *services*.

For the corruption-prone expenditure items we requested our respondents to distinguish between four kinds of payments:

- Official fees
- Unofficial fees replacing official fees but not exceeding them
- Unofficial fees, exceeding the official amount, henceforth called bribes
- Gifts

As it turned out our respondents were either unwilling or unable to differentiate between the official and the unofficial – replacing the official – fees. In hindsight, we might have expected this. The distinction can be made from two perspectives. If it is made from the perspective of the service receiver, it clearly puts the respondent in the position of admitting to bribing his way out of an official fee, cheating the government of legitimate revenue. If, on the other hand, it is made from the perspective of the institution delivering the service, for all practical purposes the difference is irrelevant to the one receiving the service. To the one receiving the service, it does not matter where the money goes, it does not matter that there is an official fee that differs from what one pays in practice, what matters is that one needs a service and to get it one has to pay a certain amount.

Before reporting our results we want to stress what these impact figures do and what they do not tell. The survey results tell us how corruption impacts households through direct unofficial payments by households to service delivery agents that make life unnecessarily expensive for them. They do not tell us how corruption makes life unnecessarily expensive through inflating prices in general, not only for services but also indirectly for food and non-food items, the purchase of which does not involve any unofficial payments between consumer and retailer, but the price of which does reflect such payments further up the commodity chain. It also does not show the extent to which corruption makes services inaccessible. We did not try to explore respondents' opinions on services not available to them because of corruption barriers. Such expenditures not made do not show up as impacting the family budget but the barriers obviously impact the families' right to access, welfare and well-being.

The relative impact of bribes on the household's budget

The first table that we present gives a summary overview of the relative impact of bribes on the household's budget.

Table 33: Reported bribes as a proportion of total expenditure (or income) is a very limited indicator of the impact of corruption on the household economy

	Total average Expenditure	WB2000*	Rural-Urban				SES		
			U	S-U	A-R	R-R	B-A	A	A-A
Food	46.1%		37.4%	46.6%	50.6%	57.1%	58.2%	49.6%	34.4%
Non-Food, excluding services & donations	38.4%		40.3%	37%	38%	33.2%	29.5%	34.5%	48.4%
Total Services	13.2%		19.1%	14.2%	9.8%	8.1%	10.9%	14%	14.3%
Bribes	1.4%	2.2%	2.1%	1.5%	0.9%	1%	0.9%	1.3%	1.8%
Gifts & Donations	0.9%		1.1%	1%	0.7%	0.6%	0.6%	0.8%	1.1%
Total	\$1816		\$3554	\$2124	\$1396	\$1265	\$1071	\$1800	\$3701

* This percentage is not of expenditure but of income

What immediately stands out is the very limited impact, 1.4%, of direct bribes on the household economy. This is lower than the World Bank 2000 diagnostic survey figure, 2.2% of reported HH income, but in line with the 2000 Thai diagnostic survey results which reported a 1.3% ratio of average bribe to total annual HH income. The gifts and donations category includes gifts in return for services and other donations. The gifts in return for services (see table 35) are insignificant in relation to the bribe amount. So the amount in table 34 is attributable to other donations (charity, merit-making, relatives, local development projects, etc.).

However, what we report here is the share of bribe payments of reported *expenditure*. Detailed analysis (see Annex III) shows that the equivalent share of reported *income* is much higher, in the order of 5%. As other corruption diagnostics use income as the basis for their indicator, for comparative purposes one should use 5% rather than 1.4%.

We will explore the ratio of bribes to total expenditure further in the following analysis but we are confident that the detailed nature of our expenditure battery plays a major role in the genesis of our result. The 1.4% is a better representation of the impact of direct bribe payments on the household economy. As stated above, this does not mean that the indirect effects of corruption by service providers are insubstantial. They are not, but we cannot expect average citizens to provide accurate assessments of these indirect effects. A survey instrument can deliver more or less reliable data on what respondents can legitimately be expected to know. i.e. on direct but *not* on indirect impacts on their families' expenditures.

What also catches the eye is that the usually reported disproportionately big burden of corruption for *low* income households does not show in our results. On the contrary, it is the well-off group that seems to bear the biggest burden. And the urbanites are also more affected than the rural citizens. Again, we believe that this results from using a much more detailed battery of questions than normally used in corruption diagnostics. In this case the effect does not derive from introducing the distinction between official costs, informal costs at or below the level of official costs, etc. but from monetizing non-cash expenditure. The standard indicator for impact – proportion of bribe payments of reported income – uses an income figure that does not include non-cash income. In contexts like Cambodia, with a largely rural population, many living at subsistence level and being dependant on various sources of non-

cash income (produce from land, fishing, barter, forest products etc.) an overall income question will elicit cash-income only and under-report actual income of the poor. This will result in an indicator that shows a larger share of bribes for the poor. Our more comprehensive probes of income and expenditure can be expected to have resulted in figures for both that are much less prone to this livelihood-related under-reporting bias and thus in figures for income and expenditure that are a better reflection of reality.

The table also suggests why the better-off (and the city dwellers) have to devote larger shares of their total expenditures to bribes. Direct bribe payments are near totally associated with what we have loosely called 'services'. Both the better-off and city dwellers devote substantially more of their total expenditure to services and thus pay a larger share of total expenditure in bribes. Again, it is important to remember what this finding does and does not tell us. It does not tell us that the poor are less impacted by corruption. It just means that those using more services are also those paying more bribes. If anything, the overall conclusion that corruption impacts the poor more than the rich – a conclusion reached by most regional corruption diagnostics that we are aware of - is correct. However, we argue that these studies arrive at this conclusion for the wrong reason. The least our data suggest is that the bigger impact on poor households is more due to a lack of access/avoidance of (basic) services than to these households paying proportionately more bribes. And although we cannot quantify the differential indirect impact of corruption on poor and rich households of price inflation because of corruption, this again can be expected to have a bigger impact on the poor. Even if only because lack of access to basic food and non-food items caused by inflated prices should always be rated as indicating *more* severe impact than the inflated prices in themselves.

Which services are most corruption prone

Next, let us look at which services are most corruption prone. Table 34 below provides information at the level of specific services on the percentage of all HH that had any kind of contact with the service during last year, the percentage of households who reported any bribe payment, the likelihood of a bribe conditional upon contact and the average annual bribe amount for the service. For comparative purposes we include some results from the World Bank 2000 diagnostic. When reading the table one should be aware that the year 2000 sample was *not representative*, being more than half urban. Table 35 shows the proportion of bribes in the total yearly costs for each service. And table 36 reports the share of each service in the yearly total amount of bribes.

There are only two basic services that the majority of HH have had any contact with, public education and private health care. *Public education* clearly stands out as the institution responsible for more than half of the total yearly amount spent on bribes (table 36). This is very different from the year 2000 results when courts topped the list, followed by customs and tax. The reported top position of education seems in need of explanation given its mid-range rating in the integrity questions (tables 29-31). Table 35 seems to provide part of the answer. It is the services that rate particularly badly on the *ratio between official costs versus bribes* that top the list of most dishonest institutions (police, customs, and courts). And education has quite a modest ratio. But this can only very partially explain the discrepancy. Table 38 below, takes a closer look at education.

Apart from the reported amounts (see comments above), one other service that stands out is public health care, with a much lower likelihood of bribes conditional upon contact in our

data than in 2000. As seen earlier, people are increasingly negative about public health services (table 9) and seem to avoid them preferring to pay (very) substantial amounts for better service at private facilities (see contact frequency private versus public health, in table 34, and yearly official costs at private and public facilities in table 35). This seems to indicate that Cambodians are just giving up on public health services.

Public health services have an *even lower* ratio between official costs and bribes than education, but nevertheless they rate *higher* on the list of government agencies and sectors most in need of cleaning up (tables 30-31). 'Giving up' should thus not be understood as 'not being bothered'. Cambodians are well aware of the expenses associated with their choice for private providers, expenses that they seem to feel are only necessary because the performance of the public system is sub-standard. We have also reached the limit here of what a survey instrument can deliver. In Cambodia, public and private health care providers are to a certain extent intertwined. What from the client perspective can look as 'official' costs for good private care, can from a 'system' perspective be seen as income diverted from the public to the private parts of the system. But however that may be, this can only be part of the explanation because at most one out of three contacts with a private provider can be the result of such a diversion.

When reading the tables below it is important to realize that all figures have been rounded to the nearest \$0.5. This implies that some services can have HH reporting bribes (e.g. construction permit, business licenses), but no bribe amounts, and even the other way around (i.e. private education), and that the totals in table 35 can differ from the amount resulting from a simple addition of the figures in the preceding columns.

Table 34: Number of contacts, Frequency and amount of Bribes

	% of HH with any contact	WB2000	% of HH reporting bribes	Likelihood of bribes conditional on contact	WB2000	Average annual bribe amount	WB2000
Public education	72%	63%	24%	33%	41%	\$13	\$5
Judge/Courts	1%	8%	1%	100%	68%	\$3.5	\$11
Traffic police	10%	15%	5%	50%	89%	\$2.5	\$3
Police excluding traffic police	6%	11%	4%	67%	79%	\$2.5	\$2
Customs	2%	2%	1%	50%	79%	\$1.0	\$10
Public health services	31%	52%	4%	13%	57%	\$0.5	\$4
Public registry	25%	44%	8%	32%	59%	\$0.5	\$3
Land administration	5%	NA	1%	20%	NA	\$0.5	NA
Private health services	92%	NA	-	-	NA	-	NA
Public electricity services	12%	53%	1%	8%	37%	-	\$2
Private electricity services	8%		-	-		-	NA
Water	22%	30%	-	-	35%	-	\$2
Private education	14%	NA	-	-	NA	\$0.5	NA
business licensing	4%	NA	1%	25%	NA	-	NA
Construction permit	1%	7%	1%	100%	71%	-	\$5
Tax authorities/inspector	NA	36%	NA	NA	66%	NA	\$9
Telephone service	NA	9%	NA	NA	11%	NA	-
Post office	NA	8%	NA	NA	26%	NA	-
Office of social benefits	NA	2%	NA	NA	38%	NA	-

Table 35: Payments for services, bribes as part of total costs for services

	Official Fees	Informal fees exceeding the official fee level (bribes)	ratio	Gifts	Total
Public education	\$73.5	\$13	18%	\$1	\$86.5
Private health services	\$70	-	-	-	\$70
Private education	\$32.5	\$0.5	2%	-	\$32.5
Public electricity services	\$25	-	-	-	\$25
Water	\$14.5	-	-	-	\$14.5
Public health services	\$8	\$0.5	6%	-	\$9
Private electricity services	\$6.5	-	-	-	\$6.5
Judge/Courts	\$3.5	\$3.5	100%	-	\$7
Public registry	\$2	\$0.5	25%	-	\$2.5
business licensing	\$1	-	-	-	\$1
Land administration	\$1	\$0.5	50%	-	\$1
Construction permit	\$0.5	-	-	-	\$0.5
Traffic police	\$0.5	\$2.5	500%	-	\$3
Police excluding traffic police	\$0.5	\$2.5	500%	-	\$3
Customs	\$0.5	\$1	200%	-	\$1
Total *	\$239.5	\$24.5	10%	\$1	\$263

* Differences are caused by rounding figures to the nearest \$ 0.5.

Table 36: Education is responsible for half of all HH corruption expenditure

	Proportion of Bribes paid to each service, as % of the total bribes	WB2000
Public education	53%	9%
Judge/Courts	14%	20%
Traffic police	10%	5%
Police excluding traffic police	10%	4%
Customs	4%	17%
Private education	2%	
Public health services	2%	8%
Public registry	2%	6%
Land administration	2%	
Public electricity services	-	4%
Private electricity services	-	
Water	-	3%
Private health services	-	
business licensing	-	
Construction permit	-	8%
Tax authorities/inspector	NA	16%
Total	100%	100%

Tables 35 (and 36) also show that 6 of the 16 services have negligible amounts for bribe payments. Private health services, the utilities (public and private electricity and water), business licensing and construction permits. Mind you this does not necessarily mean that these services are clean. Nearly all of them show bribes paid by urban, better-off, see table 37 below. And, most of these services are either one-off (license, permit) or involve a one-time connection. This means all are prone to the risk of bribes being barriers to access, a barrier that does not show up as a financial impact.

It is also important to realize that in all the tables the averages reported are calculated across *all* respondents. This means that they refer as it were to an *average* Cambodian household. When assessing the impact of corruption within a particular service this is only one of the possible perspectives to take. Another perspective is to look at only those households that use the particular service. Both perspectives have advantages and disadvantages. One of the advantages of the latter perspective is that it gives a more accurate picture of the likelihood and magnitude of bribe payments for services that are used by only a small proportion of all respondent households. Table 37A (see Annex V) confirms that services like business licensing and construction permits are indeed not corruption free at all.

Private health care services are the odd one out. However, private services are much less prone to being accused of corruption. They cost what the provider charges and people may complain about the high level of costs but will not easily experience these as bribes. We will return to this issue in the concluding section

Differences across rural/urban areas and socio-economic groups

We now look at the differences between urban and rural areas and between different socio-economic classes in the proportionate share of different services in the total expenditure for services. Table 33 above shows that the more urban and the richer, the larger the share of expenditure for services and bribes. Proportionately, urban respondents spend more than twice as much on services than remote rural respondents, and respondents of above average Socio-Economic Status (SES) spend a third more than those below average. Other expenditure categories vary in similar ways:

-
- The more rural and the lesser well off the respondent households, the higher the share of food expenditure in total expenditure;
 - The more rural and the lesser well off the respondent households, the lower the share of Non-food expenditure (excluding services & donations) in total expenditure;
 - The more rural and the lesser well off the respondent households, the lower the share of gifts and donations in total expenditure.

Regarding expenditures for services are there significant differences that the shares of various services constitute of the total. Table 37 reports the breakdown of various services. Table 37A in Annex V gives a summary overview of average bribe amounts, calculated on the basis of those respondents actually paying, rather than all respondents.

Table 37: Payments for services, rural & urban respondents and different socio-economic groups

	Official Fees & Unofficial Fees replacing official payments, but not exceeding them *				Bribes				Official Fees & Unofficial Fees replacing official payments, but not exceeding them			Bribes		
	U	S-U	A-R	R-R	U	S-U	A-R	R-R	B-A	A	A-A	B-A	A	A-A
Public education	26%	37%	34%	33%	59%	55%	50%	24%	35%	33%	26%	71%	66%	43%
Judge/Courts	-	-	3%	-	7%	5%	29%	-	6%	-	-	6%	7%	21%
Traffic police	-	-	-	-	15%	3%	4%	32%	-	-	-	-	2%	18%
Police excluding traffic police	-	-	-	-	8%	6%	4%	36%	-	-	-	12%	18%	6%
Customs	-	-	-	-	-	23%	4%	8%	-	-	-	-	2%	6%
Public health services	1%	4%	6%	6%	3%	2%	4%	-	4%	3%	4%	6%	-	-
Public registry	1%	-	-	-	3%	2%	4%	-	-	1%	1%	-	2%	2%
Land administration	1%	-	-	-	1%	3%	-	-	-	-	1%	-	2%	1%
Private education	20%	15%	6%	3%	3%	-	-	-	5%	13%	19%	6%	-	-
Private electricity services	2%	8%	2%	-	-	2%	-	-	3%	3%	3%	-	-	-
Construction permit	-	-	-	-	1%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%
Public electricity services	21%	5%	1%	-	-	-	-	-	4%	11%	14%	-	-	-
Water	9%	5%	4%	3%	-	-	-	-	5%	7%	6%	-	-	-
Private health services	17%	23%	44%	54%	-	-	-	-	38%	29%	25%	-	-	-
business licensing	-	2%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1%	-	-	-
Total**	\$678	\$302	\$134	\$103	\$76	\$31	\$12	\$13	\$116	\$252	\$528	\$9	\$22	\$68

* The share of unofficial fees replacing official fees, but not exceeding them, is way below 1% of the total.

** Because the gifts are not included, again way less than 1%, these figures are technically not totals, but for all practical purposes they are.

When examining this table, some interesting insights emerge in the patterns of differential bribe impacts for people living in different areas and being more or less well-off. There are only two services for which the bulk of total costs are official: public education and public health services. Nevertheless, the two are services for which bribes are an important component of total costs, and it is those at average or below SES levels in the city that suffer the most. For them, the ratio of the share of official costs for that service and the share of bribe costs is most negative, e.g. the share of bribe costs for public education (share of all bribe costs) for urban Cambodians is more than twice (2.15) the share of official costs for public education (share of all official costs for services), while for remote rural Cambodians the ratio is around .75. For public health it is actually the *urban poor*, again indicating that as soon as Cambodians can afford an alternative to the public system, they will turn their back on it.

For both services, the most positive ratio is for remote rural citizens, indicating the lack of access rather than anything else. Facilities are just too costly (in money and time) to reach.

Of the other services:

- The courts are the biggest burden for the richer accessible rural Cambodians;
- Traffic police impacts richer urban and remote rural Cambodians most;
- Other police impact the average and below remote rural citizens;
- Customs impacts richer semi-urban Cambodians;
- Most other services (public registry, land administration, construction permits) are only directly impacting the urban rich.

Public Education

Above we hinted at one part of the explanation for the ‘discrepancy’ between the share of public education in the total yearly amount of bribes and its slightly positive integrity ranking and it not being among the sectors spontaneously mentioned as being the most corrupt. Another part of the explanation may lie in the fact that education involves both *regular* monthly payments and *occasional* yearly payments. Table 38A below gives the breakdown of these different types of payments across all respondents (i.e. those with and without children in school). Nearly all bribes are paid on a regular basis. Although they add up to a substantial yearly amount, it seems reasonable to assume that they are not experienced as serious corruption. The monthly average amount for education is around \$1 paid in very regular ‘installments’. This makes for a quite low figure for each payment, in comparison with nearly all other bribe payments (see table 37A in Annex V for a summary overview of average actual bribe amounts). Table 38B gives the average actual bribe amounts for public education. Seen from this perspective, the actual average bribe amount is \$4.90 and about 30% of all those in public schools claim to pay such regular bribes.

When we look at the ratio of *yearly* bribe amounts as proportion of the *total* official costs it is only 1%, even more modest than the 18% reported in table 35. In as far as the reasoning above is valid, i.e. that the more skewed the ratio is, the worse the integrity rating, this

strengthens the argument that public education is not seen as a particularly bribe demanding sector.

However, although this may explain why education does not end up in the top of the list of most corrupt sectors, it still leaves us with the puzzle why it is rated positively rather than negatively in terms of institutional honesty.

If one assumes that the earlier described strong correlation between quality of service rating and institutional integrity rating (see figure page 49) indicates a causal relationship with performance rating being the cause and integrity rating being the effect, the rating of education would be less puzzling. We will explore this further in the concluding section.

The data collected allow for some speculation on average additional income of public school teachers. If one assumes that the average number of students taught by a public school teacher is 80 and that about half of the regular payments end up with the teacher (the rest being used for others within the system and to cover actual expenses), this results in an average additional monthly income of around \$60/public school teacher. The data suggest, as one would expect, huge differences between urban and rural settings, varying from around \$195 in urban to around \$15 in remote rural settings. Obviously one needs to be very careful with a figure like this because our data only allow for aggregate speculative analysis, and thus do not allow for inferences about actual teachers.

Table 38A: Bribe payments for public education are regular small payments

Public Education	Urban/ Rural				SES computed			Total
	U	S-U	A-R	R-R	Below average	Average	Above average	
Official monthly payments total per year	\$171.5	\$108	\$45	\$33	\$40.5	\$80	\$134	\$71.5
Official occasional payment total per year	\$6.5	\$2	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1.5	\$6	\$2
Official total per year	\$178	\$110	\$46	\$34	\$41.50	\$81.50	\$140	\$73.5
Bribe monthly per year	\$43	\$17	\$5.5	\$2.5	\$5.5	\$14	\$28	\$12.5
Bribe yearly	\$1.5	-	\$0.5	\$0.5	\$0.5	\$0.5	\$1	\$0.5
Bribe Total per year	\$44.5	\$17	\$6	\$3	\$6	\$14.5	\$29	\$13
Bribe Total per year/ Off + Unofficial	25%	15%	13%	9%	14%	18%	21%	18%
Bribe yearly/ Off + Unofficial	1%	-	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%	1%

Table 38B: Payments for public education services

Public Education	Urban/ Rural				SES computed			Total
	U	S-U	A-R	R-R	Below average	Average	Above average	
Official monthly payments total per year	\$235	\$149.5	\$63	\$51.5	\$57.5	\$108.5	\$195	\$100.5
Official occasional payment total per year	\$33	\$9	\$5	\$7	\$4	\$7	\$30.5	\$10
Official total per year \$	\$268	\$158.5	\$68	\$58.5	\$61.5	\$115.5	\$225.5	\$110.5
Official total per year N	237	153	974	68	677	491	264	1432
Bribe monthly per year \$	\$116.5	\$64	\$32	\$17	\$37.5	\$56.5	\$88.5	\$59
Bribe monthly per year N	120	55	237	16	143	164	121	428
Bribe yearly \$	\$12	\$4	\$4.5	\$1.5	\$3.5	\$6	\$9.5	\$6
Bribe yearly N	40	15	95	13	62	56	45	163
Number Respondent s	325	210	1360	105	956	661	383	2000

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusion revisits a couple of the issues that our data have brought up and is an effort to add supportive analysis to our initial interpretations.

The issues are a mix of methodological and substantive explorations. The survey provides us with some very interesting insights in people's opinions on corruption and the impact of corruption on their daily life. As stated in the introduction, we have explicitly tried to produce regionally and historically comparable data in order to ensure an interesting context for our findings. But it also served as a laboratory for some innovations. This section will address the following issues that are relevant to these purposes:

- The use of expenditure rather than income as the basis for calculating an indicator for impact of bribe payments on the household economy;
- The limitations of this indicator to establish impact;
- Factors that seem to increase the negative impact of corruption;
- The use of vignettes;
- The relationship between the perceived performance and the perceived integrity of service providers;
- The influence of the size of a payment per se;
- The decreased moral acceptance of corruption in Cambodia.

Using expenditure rather than income

Our instrument differs considerably from the normal kind of corruption diagnostic because of our efforts to get more valid income and expenditure data. Annex III assesses the outcome of this effort. In as far as income is only used as an indicator of relative SES, it seems reasonably acceptable. However, as a basis to estimate absolute impact of bribe payments at household level, it seems insufficient.

As the standard indicator for assessing impact at household level – bribe payments as proportion of reported income - uses income at an *absolute* level, this means that for contexts like the Cambodian this indicator is problematic. We have estimated that the 1.4% proportion of bribe payments of reported expenditure that our data indicate is equivalent to at least 5% of reported cash income. The gap between the two is too large to ignore. Still, survey research always has to balance practical costs and benefits of particular indicators and one may legitimately argue that the costs of using expenditure are too high (too much survey time). However, given the flaws of the income alternative, the most sensible conclusion then is to accept that we need other indicators for establishing impact of bribe payments at household level.

Our data show that the distributions of reported income and expenditure are quite different. We have no empirical evidence for this difference being country specific, characteristic for LDC's, characteristic for particular kinds of LDC's, or any other assumption for that matter.

It might be the case that in countries where cash income and total income are the same, both distributions are much more alike and income is thus less flawed as a basis for an impact indicator. On the other hand, the purpose of all corruption diagnostics is partly comparative. To the extent that this is the case, using an indicator that is only acceptable for some but not other countries creates problems.

So, the choice seems to boil down to either accepting that for measuring bribe impact only (time intensive) expenditure will do as an indicator, or develop other indicators.

The limitations of the current impact indicator – be it based on income or expenditure

The paragraph above already suggests that the issue of assessing the impact of corruption at household level is in need of new indicators. What our data tell us is that expenditure is a better, more valid basis than income for expressing impact in terms of the ratio of yearly bribe of some other monetary indicator. However, this does not mean that the ratio indicator itself is very meaningful.

Although our finding that the richer urban households proportionally pay most bribes is not unique – e.g. a 2001 Indonesia diagnostic reached a similar result²⁹ - most diagnostics report higher impact on lower income households.³⁰ It might well be that the ‘popularity’ of the income-based impact indicator is not only due to its ‘cost effectiveness’, but also to its by and large behaving-according-to-expectations. Policy research is by nature a very pragmatic business and indicators are good enough to the extent that they are specific, measurable and feasible, *and* seem in line with other less systematic but nevertheless credible information.

But, as argued in the reporting section above, it doesn’t take much imagination to understand our ‘unexpected’ finding. Direct bribe payments are largely confined to what we have loosely defined as the services sector. The relative share of services expenditure is highest for richer and urban households. So why not expect a concordant larger share of bribe payments for these same households?

At the same time, the assumption that corruption impacts poor households stronger than rich households seems indisputable. The obvious links between corruption and poverty are manifold.³¹ The issue is how to capture this with a diagnostic household survey instrument. Of all the links between corruption and poverty, it is probably this same link between services and poverty that is going to prove most fruitful as a source of alternative HH survey indicators for assessing the differential impact of corruption on the poor and the rich.

Again, the major reason for this is that access to services and quality of services can, to a certain extent, be measured in a survey. But, very similar to the indicator used in this study, it is going to require an elaborate battery to produce substantial results. The problem is that we not only want to establish whether the poor have less access to lower quality services, but also that this is directly related to corruption.

²⁹ Partnership for Governance Reform (2001), p. 13

³⁰ E.g. World bank (2000) diagnostics on Cambodia and Thailand, both report a substantially bigger impact - for both around three times as big - on lower income households.

³¹ E.g. see the framework on the corruption, mis-governance and poverty nexus described in Kaufmann et al. (2002)

In the end, it might very well be the case that a survey is not the best instrument to establish overall or aggregate differential impact of corruption on the household economy. Service specific diagnostics may be more appropriate to tap the processes at work leading to differential impact between rich and poor.

Factors which seem to increase the negative impact of corruption

Having said that, we maintain that our data also allow for some positive conclusions regarding impact indicators. We are now going to revisit some that have revealed potential for use in other diagnostics.

The first of these is the expressed confidence that a bribe is going to result in the service or the problem solving sought. This indicator sets Cambodian respondents apart from their Thai counterparts, i.e. makes for interesting international comparison, shows quite strong rural/urban and educational differences, i.e. works for revealing within-country differentials along relevant backgrounders, and is conceptually grounded in the current international corruption debate.

Secondly, we had a battery of questions related to factors determining the amount of a bribe and the implications of the amount being negotiable or not. The results of this battery evoke a reality of institutionalized corruption that seems to fit with anecdotal and case study evidence. Neither wealth nor sex is seen as influencing the amount of a bribe. ‘Tariffs’ seem pretty much fixed and only personal relationships are seen to offer scope for really undercutting ‘standards’.

This lack of room for negotiation qualifies the answers to the question about being bothered when one cannot bring requested amounts down to reasonable levels. To the extent that the answers to the first two questions suggest that for many kinds of informal payments the amounts are fixed and non-negotiable, unless, as the answers to the third question suggest, one happens to have a personal relationship, the answers to the fourth question indicate that the need to pay bribes is only upsetting when one is asked more than what is known to be the going rate or when one is asked the going rate by someone with whom one has a personal relationship.

Table 39: The amount of a bribe

Questions	Net Opinion
The amount paid depends on whether the person is poor or rich	-18%
Women are normally asked for higher bribes than men	-31%
Kinship and being friends reduces the amount of a bribe necessary to get something done	+46%
When an official takes bribes I am only bothered when I cannot negotiate the amount down to a reasonable level	+55%

The perception that wealth does not determine tariffs implies higher impact of corruption on the poor. Given our finding that this impact does not translate into a higher ratio of bribes to expenditure for the poor, this directly implies restricted access to services. The poor do not access the services the tariffs of which they cannot pay and thereby feel a serious indirect effect of high prices for services.

The perception that only personal relationships, fashionably ‘social capital’, can bring amounts down, also suggest larger impact on the poor. The networks of the poor are much

more limited than those of the rich,³² and certainly include much fewer gatekeepers of services (a position which implies education).

The lack of differentiation of rates for rich and poor may also be read as an indicator for something else. A more or less fixed rate implies a lower limit. A lower limit implies that the door keeper for the service is either not willing or not able to work for less. Door keepers of services, the street level bureaucrats of Cambodia, are normally not in a personal socio-economic position that allows them to be very selective in what they consider adequate remuneration for their services. Their official pay is minimal and any additional income is welcome. This suggests that 'not willing' is only a reasonable explanation for situations in which they have so much demand for their services of rich clients that they can afford to turn the business of poorer clients down. Therefore, it is very likely that 'not able' is a reasonable explanation for more of the lower limits than 'not willing'. Not being able to work cheaper means that a large share of the fee is not pocketed directly but passed on. Obviously, this is what characterizes institutionalized pyramidal systems of corruption, which is how the Cambodian governance reality has been described in recent analyses.³³ What is relevant here is that this line of argument ties fixed rates to a particular form of corrupt government. In other words, makes them an *indicator* for such a form of government.

The use of vignettes

One technique that we believe holds great potential for providing systematic access to the conceptual understanding of respondents is the use of short situation descriptions, often called 'vignettes'. Our use of situation descriptions in this study only touches the surface of this potential. We did not go beyond presenting a list of different situations and asking the respondents to indicate how acceptable or unacceptable they regarded the behavior displayed in the description.

This use was based on an underlying expectation, based upon Thai research, about a conceptual hierarchy of acceptability. But the technique offers much more fine-grained possibilities. Basic ingredients of a situation/story are its actors, the action, and the circumstances/context. The question posed to the respondents can be evaluative (like our acceptability rating), but also one about the most likely explanation for what happens, about what the respondent himself would do if she were a particular actor, about the reasoning or the feeling of one of the characters, etc. And the question can be open as well as closed. Based on one's theoretical expectations about what matters to people's understandings or evaluations, systematic variation of one or more of the ingredients relevant to those expectations allows for testing these expectations.

Apart from testing theoretical expectations, the technique simultaneously allows for some control of phrasing, order of presentation and similar effects. Especially when combining it with a split sample approach.

In a study on corruption the potential for exploring e.g. respondents' confidence that a bribe is going to result in the service or the problem solving sought or for exploring respondents' understanding of the extent to which bribes amounts are negotiable or dependent upon bribe-

³² This is such a universal empirical finding that many concepts of poverty include it as a defining characteristic

³³ E.g. Hughes et al. (2003), USAID (2004) and Nissen (2005).

giver characteristics are obvious. Services can vary, giver and taker characteristics can vary, etc.

The technique has an obvious limitation: variations very quickly result in too many vignettes. So careful consideration of what is essential and what should be dealt with using split samples, is important. But careful consideration of questions is the hallmark of good survey research anyway, so this should not distract from the possibilities the technique offers.

Perceived performance and perceived integrity of service providers

We have suggested that if one assumes that the earlier described strong correlation between quality of service rating and institutional integrity rating (see figure) indicates a causal relationship with performance rating being the cause and integrity rating being the effect, the rating of education would be less puzzling. What kind of supporting evidence for this assumption can our data muster?

One way of checking that is to enter the said assumption into the calculation of a composite measure for corruption severity - an indicator - and then see if this composite indicator correlates better with a direct measure of corruption severity than a composite indicator without it. As the direct measure we take the proportion of respondents who single out a particular institution as the most dishonest amongst a list of 25 institutions (see table 29). The composite measures take the following elements into account:

- The ratio of actual average bribe payments and actual official payments (derived from Annex V, table 37B); this means the ratio as derived from the sub-set of respondents that paid for the services under consideration rather than the ratios as reported in table 35 which are derived from the averages across all respondents;
- The actual average bribe amounts (Annex V, table 37A). The results of table 24 suggest that there is no public consensus about big bribes being more corrupt than small bribes. However, we have interpreted this as expressing the hypothesized decreased acceptance of all corruption (see also below), rather than the amount of the bribe not influencing people's judgment. Indeed, several other results indicate that size of bribe *does* matter. Tea money, with its connotation of being a small amount, is perceived as slightly acceptable, while bribes, with their connotation of being more substantial, are not seen as such (table 23). And although gifts are perceived as very acceptable, they become problematic when they are too large (table 10 and argument below table 23). And the fact that a majority of respondents indicated that they are only bothered by a corrupt official if they cannot negotiate the amount down to a reasonable level (table 27) also strongly indicates the importance of the size of a bribe.

And then one of them adds:

- The Performance rating (table 9).

The reasoning underlying this choice is that we expect respondents' assessment of how corrupt a particular institution is to be more negative to the extent that:

- The actual bribe amounts are higher;

- The ratio of bribe payments versus official payments is more skewed towards bribe payments (i.e. if 2 out of 3 payments are bribe payments the institution is rated as more corrupt than if 1 out of 10 payments is a bribe);
- The quality of the service provided is perceived as worse.

In order to visualize the relationship we have introduced three transformations:

- We have not entered the actual average bribe amount into the index but its base-10 logarithm.
- The performance rating is reversed (plus has become minus).
- The performance rating is multiplied by 10 to 'standardize' the scaling.

The formula for calculating the indicator is then straightforward:

Ratio * Log (bribe amount) and
Ratio * Log (bribe amount) * perceived quality of service

We have done this for a limited number of core institutions. The resulting data table is produced below:

Table 40: Correlation between Corruption severity index and most dishonest institution rating

	ratio bribes/official costs (table 37b)	actual average bribe (table 37a)	log10	Performance rating (table 9)	Index without performance rating	Index with performance rating	Most dishonest rating (table 29) *10
Public Health service providers	0.14	15.5	1.190332	0.25	0.166646	0.041662	0.20
Public education	0.11	6	0.778151	-0.12	0.085597	-0.01027	0.60
Traffic Police	0.83	53.5	1.728354	0.34	1.434534	0.487741	1.70
Police excluding traffic police	1.59	72.5	1.860338	0.34	2.957937	1.005699	2.60
Customs	0.70	90	1.954243	0.67	1.36797	0.91654	2.80
Judge/Courts	1.58	357.5	2.553276	0.62	4.034176	2.501189	5.30

* For public education, the figures for the first two columns are ratios for occasional rather than regular payments, taken from table 38B, rather than 37A&B.

Correlation between Corruption severity indicators and most dishonest institution rating




Figure 2 above visualizes the results. To the extent that our first two assumptions are valid, i.e. that the size of the bribe and the ratio of bribes to official payments determine perceived corruption – and that certainly seems the case - the third assumption, that perceived quality influences rather than follows from perceived corruption is supported by the results. Without taking perceived performance into account the composite indicator reverses the positions of traffic police and other police and it does not differentiate between traffic police and customs.

The influence of the size of a payment per se

Figure 2 supports that the size of actual bribe payments to a particular institution co-determines the rating of that institution as the most dishonest one, the other determinants being the ratio between official payments and bribe payments and the perceived quality of the service delivered by that institution.

This makes one wonder if the size of official payments is also loaded with a moral component. A finding that seems to contradict that the size of official payments is in any way connected to an increasing likelihood of such payments being labeled as corrupt is the relatively very high payments to private health providers (see table 35), because these are not perceived as corruption at all.

Obviously, market transactions are a very different category from bribes, but to the extent that the average amounts of *bribe* payments co-determine the integrity rating of a service it does seem possible that the average amount of a market transaction *price* is also judged in moral terms.³⁴ Given the high levels of poverty and thus high levels of inability to pay for expensive services in Cambodia, some level of public grumbling about high costs would seem understandable.

However, when thinking about the particular example of expenditure for private health services, one has to keep in mind that the result reported in table 35, private health care expenditure constituting nearly one-third of total official services expenditure (as opposed to 3% for public health services), is an *average across all respondents*. But differing numbers of respondents made actual use of various services (table 37B, with private health services, standing out as the single most used service) and the average expenditure differences are strongly influenced by this rate of use. Table 37A in the appendix gives the reported expenditures for those actually using a particular service. Now private health services do not stand out as far as their share of total expenditure is concerned.

So in order to investigate the possible relationship between the size of official costs and integrity ratings we have broadened our scope to include the six services that have the highest actual expenditure (i.e. averaged across those reporting any expenditure for the particular service rather than all respondents).³⁵ Figure 3 below shows the relationship between the actual official expenditures for those six services, their performance ratings and their integrity ratings. We have included integrity *and* performance ratings that correlate strongly, to have a benchmark for what constitutes a close relationship.

³⁴ E.g. in the very simple four type conceptual scheme for payments of Rose-Ackerman (1999), the two types involving a quid pro quo transaction are ‘price’ and ‘bribe’

³⁵ Because the integrity rating for electricity services does not specify public or private we have used the actual average expenditure of both.


In order to visualize the relationship we have introduced two transformations:

- We have not graphed the actual average expenditure amount but its base-10 logarithm.
- The performance and integrity ratings are reversed.
- The performance and integrity ratings are divided by 20 to ‘standardize’ the scaling.

It is immediately visible that private education does not fit into the overall pattern, signifying that unlike the consistent relationship between performance rating and honesty rating, size of official expenditure corresponds with perceived integrity for many of the more expensive services, but not consistently. It seems likely that the correspondence is spurious, mediated by other factors like the ratio of bribe payments to official payments.

Thus, the data do *not* seem to confirm that Cambodians associate expense *per se* with corruption.

Relationship actual official expenditure, perceived quality of service and perceived integrity



The decreased moral acceptance of corruption in Cambodia

If we were to indicate the most pervasive trend in our data it is that Cambodians increasingly reject corruption on moral grounds. We end this section with a summary overview of the results that underlie this conclusion regarding the Cambodian opinion climate. But first we want to frame the understanding of our argument correctly.

Our respondents were very undecided about endorsing or denying corruption as a fact of life with about half choosing the neither agree nor disagree option and the other half being split between endorsers and deniers (table 21). Ostensibly, this result can be contrasted with the 1998 CSD finding of 68% Net endorsement of corruption as a fact of life when the options were a forced choice between endorsing and denying. However, as we have argued earlier, we believe the most plausible interpretation of this result to be that most respondents who read the question as referring to the existence of corruption – and not as endorsing corruption – would still agree with it.

Supporting this interpretation are the results to several other questions. Citizens overwhelmingly agree that paying official fees and following official procedures costs very much time, and with this implicitly endorse official fees and procedures as ‘inviting’ informal circumvention (table 26). Also, a majority is only bothered by a corrupt official if the amount cannot be negotiated down to a reasonable level, thereby endorsing the implicit assumption that bribe negotiation as such is a fact of life (table 27). It is also telling that those living in the most corruption prone environment, the urbanites, are more likely to read a morally neutral, existence of corruption rather than endorsement of corruption meaning into both the fact of life and the negotiation question.

Thus, we assume that the following discussion regarding increased moral rejection of corruption is not understood as implying a denial by our respondents that corruption is a fact of life in Cambodia. However the above also shows that a conclusion like this is more an argument than an empirical statement. An expression of the validity issues surrounding survey research. The box below on surveys as laboratories promotes the idea of more professional recognition of the limitations of our current instruments and more explicit experimentation to improve them.

A second frame for the understanding of our argument is that we assume public recognition of the negative social consequences of corruption to be steadily increasing. The influx of foreign assistance and organizations during and since UNTAC has been accompanied by an influx and spread of associated new vocabulary and conceptions of human rights, democracy, good governance etc. The impact on public opinion of this new discourse is not well documented but growing familiarity and knowledge of what is considered proper, normal, legitimate etc. seems beyond doubt.³⁶ This implies that when we judge changes in public opinion regarding corruption as tapped by survey questions we may attribute these to actual attitudinal change, to changed awareness of what are the socially desirable answers, or, most probable, a mix of both. We have no way on knowing what the mix looks like but in general the shift in opinions between 1998 and 2004 seems *too large* to attribute to social desirability alone.

³⁶ E.g for Human rights, see Vijghen, 2001, for democracy, see Henke & Hean, 2004

Now, for the decreasing moral acceptability itself, our data include the following corroborating results:

We presented respondents with the same ‘corruption is a fact of life, it is the normal way of doing things’ statement that was used in the 1998 CSD survey. Instead of a +68% Net opinion we only got a +4% Net opinion. As explained earlier the difference can be partly explained by the different answer grids, in 1998 respondents were requested to describe the statement as either true or false, our survey offered them a balanced five-point agreement-disagreement answer grid. However, given no indication that the existence of corruption is less recognized in 2004 (see above), the difference in the percentage of those calling the statement false (16%) in 1998 and disagreeing in 2004 (24%) we interpreted this to indicate decreased moral acceptance. However, the difference is not big enough to maintain that it could not have been expressing stronger social desirability awareness only.

The second result is more solid: we presented respondents with eight different situations describing behavior that is often labeled improper or corrupt and asked them how acceptable they judged the behavior to be. Seven of the eight displays of non-integrity were *near unanimously* described as unacceptable. Let’s compare these with their 1998 “equivalents” (when available):

Table 41 Increased moral rejection of corruption: comparing 1998 and 2004 data

1998 Question	Net Opinion 1	2004 Question	Net Opinion 2
Patronage is wrong	-74%	A person is promoted because he is the relative or protégé of a senior officer	-92%
It is right for workers with small salaries to take home office supplies	-27%	A government official takes paper and pencils from the office to use at home	-89%
Vote buying is acceptable	-17%	A political party offers to pay money if you vote for them in the next election	-90%
Most people prefer to pay bribes rather than traffic fines	+72%	To avoid having to visit the police station and pay a full fine, a traffic offender offers to pay 5,000 Riel directly to a traffic policeman. The policeman did not ask for the money, but accepted it.	-89%
It is right for a civil servant who makes a small salary to accept extra gifts	+57%	A person visits a government office, and receives good assistance from the officer in charge. When the matter is concluded, he offers 10,000 Riel which the government official accepts	-13%

1 = answer grid is agree, somewhat agree and not at all agree (net opinion positive adds agree and somewhat agree)³⁷

2 = answer grid balanced five point scale from agree to disagree

These differences are too pronounced to be explained by heightened social desirability awareness alone.

The last situation, an underpaid official receiving a gift, has been presented in two other phrasings to our respondents, both resulting in substantially lower Net opinions than the 1998 +57% (see table 23).

³⁷ The differences would have been even more pronounced when the 1998 Net opinion would have used ‘somewhat agree’ as a neutral mid-point.

The 2004 explicit answers regarding bigger bribes being not more corrupt than smaller bribes and the 2004 denial that they would accept bribes to support their families also contrast with 1998 opinions that seem much less concerned about projecting an I-reject-corruption-in-all-forms attitude (tables 24 and 25).

Last but not least, our finding that open probing of priority actions against corruption only resulted in a good 10% mention of ‘higher salaries for civil servants’ (table 32), and an overwhelming concern with tough punitive action, contrasts sharply with the 1998 hopes of salary increase as the best way to end corruption.³⁸ This shift from higher salaries as the way forward, which implies that corrupt behavior is caused by need rather than greed, and thereby implies (moral) understanding of the bribe taker, to punitive action, which implies that bribe taking is squarely rejected, might be an indirect indication but is nevertheless as strongly supportive of our interpretation as it gets.

³⁸ The issue was asked twice. Once in multiple answer option form offering seven alternatives (top two choices: increase salaries mentioned by 79%, pass anti-corruption law by 57%) and once by probing agreement with the statement ‘higher salaries would make ending low level corruption easier (Net opinion +93%)’

SELECTED REFERENCES

- Becker, H. (1998). *Tricks of the Trade. How to think about research while you're doing it*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Center for Social Development. (1998). *National Survey on Public Attitudes Towards Corruption*. Phnom Penh.
- Council for Social Development (2002). *National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005*. Phnom Penh
- Harris, J. (2001). *Depoliticizing Development*. London: Anthem Press
- Henke, R. (2004). *Good data require good field work A discussion paper on the professional disinterest in transparent, methodologically rigorous quantitative data collection*. Phnom Penh: RUPP. Papers of the 6th Socio-cultural research congress on Cambodia, 18-20 November 2003.
- Henke, R. & Hean, S. (2004). *The state of democracy in Cambodia, the added value of opinion polls*. Paper presented at Asian Barometer conference on "The State of Democracy in Asia", Bangkok 21 October 2004
- Holloway, J., Dércole, J. & Chom Sok (2001). *Survey of knowledge, attitudes, practices and beliefs on standards in good governance in Seila*. Phnom Penh: UNOPS/PLG
- Hughes, C. & Conway, T. (2003) *Understanding Pro-poor political change: the policy process. Cambodia*. London: ODI, unreleased draft.
- Kaufmann, D., et al. (discussion draft June 2002). *Assessing governance. Diagnostic tools and applied methods for capacity building and action learning*. World Bank.
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/assessing>
- National Institute of Statistics (1999). *Kingdom of Cambodia 1998 Census CD-Rom 1-3*. Phnom Penh: NIS
- National Institute of Statistics (2000). *Report on the Cambodia Socio-economic Survey 1999*. Phnom Penh: NIS
- National Institute of Statistics (2004). *Population projections. Phnom Penh: NIS*.
- Nissen, Christine J. (2005) *Living Under the Rule of Corruption – An Analysis of Everyday Forms of Corrupt Practices in Cambodia*, Center for Social Development, Cambodia.
- Noonan, J. (1984). *Bribes. The intellectual history of a moral idea*. Berkeley: University of California Press
- Phongpaichit P., et al. (2000). *Corruption in the Public sector in Thailand. Perceptions and Experiences of Households*. Bangkok: Political Economy Centre, Chulalongkorn University
- Partnership for Governance Reform (2001). *A Diagnostic study of Corruption in Indonesia*.
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
- Phongpaichit, P. & Piriyaangsan, S. (1994). *Corruption & Democracy in Thailand*. Chiang Mai: Silkworm books (ed. 1996)

-
- Ragin, C. (1994). *Constructing Social Research*. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). *Corruption and government; causes, consequences and reform*. Cambridge University Press
- Tanur, J. (Ed.) (1992). *Questions about questions. Inquiries into the cognitive bases of surveys*. New York: Russel Sage Foundation.
- The Asia Foundation/CAS (2000). *Democracy in Cambodia. A survey of the Cambodian Electorate*.
- The Asia Foundation/CAS (2003). *Judicial Independence. Public opinion poll on citizens' perceptions of the judicial system of Cambodia*
- Thomas, V. et. al. (2000) The quality of growth. IBRD/WB. Oxford University Press
<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/qualityofgrowth/>
- Transparency International (2002). *Corruption in South Asia. Insights & Benchmarks from Citizen Feedback Surveys in Five Countries*.
- USAID (2004) *Cambodia Corruption Assessment*
- Vijghen, J. (2001). *Cambodian human rights & democracy organizations. Towards the future*. Capacity building through participatory evaluation of human rights NGOs in Cambodia, Report Nr. 40. Phnom Penh: ECR
- World Bank (2000). *Cambodia Governance and Corruption Diagnostic. Evidence from Citizen, Enterprise and Public Official Surveys*. www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance

ANNEXES

- Annex I: Definitions of Rural-Urban by the CAS survey team**
- Annex II: Construction of SES variable**
- Annex III: Income and Expenditure information compared**
- Annex IV: Occupation and its relationship with other background variables**
- Annex V: Additional tables**
- Annex VI: Questionnaire with marginals**

Annex I

Table A: Definitions of Rural-Urban by the CAS survey team

	Remote Rural	Accessible Rural	Semi-Urban	Urban
General Description	Population point far from the Main Road	Population point not far from the Main Road	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Outskirts of Provincial Capital - District town - Main Population point 	Provincial Capital
Market facilities	Far from any Market	Not far from a Big or Medium-sized Market	Medium-sized Market	Big Market
Road Access	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bad Road - Far from the Main Road 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accessible by Road - Not far from a main road 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Easy Road Access - Good Road 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Easy Road Access - Good Road
Transport services	No transport Services	Limited transport Services	More extensive transport Services	Many transport Services
Other Services (Schools, Health Centers,...)	No provision of other Services	Limited provision of other Services	More extensive provision of other Services	Many other Services
Utilities (Electricity, piped Water)	Not Available	Utilities only through private facilities (generators)	Partly covered by institutional utility Service Provision	Mostly covered by institutional utility Service Provision

Annex II

Construction of the Socio-Economic Status (SES) variable

To reliably determine household Socio-Economic Status (SES) is a very difficult and contentious issue. The increasingly elaborate Cambodia Socio-Economic Household Survey interview schedules and fieldwork procedures testify to the ongoing efforts to improve validity and reliability. This survey could only include a very limited number of the background variables that are normally used as indicators for the Socio-Economic Status of Cambodian households. However, our purpose was not to determine SES per se but rather to discover variations in opinion between respondents of varying SES. To be able to discover such variation we needed to find a reasonably robust way to assign each household to one of a very limited and number of broadly defined classes of SES.

The classes defined are labeled Below Average, Average and Above Average SES. The class definitions are a compromise between:

- The objective to divide the sample into classes of somewhat comparable size.
- The objective to let the classes to some extent reflect absolute levels of poverty/wealth.
- The objective to include both objective and subjective information.
- The objective to maximize consistency between our SES classification and other indicators of SES.
- The objective to construct an indicator that is simple enough to be understood and thus criticized by non-technical users of the results.

The input variables for our SES indicator are:

- Reported per capita yearly expenditure.
- Self-reported SES.
- Reported occurrence of hunger during the past year.

Reported yearly per capita expenditure

Because it is well known that income and expenditure levels vary between rural and urban locations – the reason MoP/UNDP uses different poverty lines to calculate poverty levels for Phnom Penh, other urban locations and rural areas, as per the census classification - we decided to use the per capita expenditure distribution for each of our 4 rural/urban areas separately for the differentiation into three SES classes. As the compromise between our first two objectives (establishing classes of comparable sizes and classes that somewhat reflect absolute SES levels) we chose a class definition of:

- Below Average SES = first 4 deciles of the per capita expenditure distribution per area.
- Average SES = next 4 deciles

- Above Average SES = top most 2 deciles

Table B below provides an overview of the cut-off points for per capita expenditure per rural/urban area. The table also indicates the top 5% per capita income range per rural/urban area:

Table B: Yearly per capita expenditure cut-off points per rural/urban area for SES class definition

In US\$	Below Average SES (0-40%)	Average SES (41-80%)	Above Average SES (81-100%)	Area top 5% per capita income (95-100%)
Urban	$x \leq 170$	$170 < x \leq 363$	$x > 363$	$683 < x \leq 1634$
Semi-Urban	$x \leq 96$	$96 < x \leq 193$	$x > 193$	$401 < x \leq 1221$
Accessible Rural	$x \leq 74$	$74 < x \leq 139$	$x > 139$	$244 < x \leq 3068$
Remote Rural	$x \leq 71$	$71 < x \leq 129$	$x > 129$	$248 < x \leq 541$

Self-reported SES

In itself this variable is useless to define SES classes because hardly any respondent self-classified her household as Above Average. Given this strong antipathy against identifying one's family as above Cambodian average, those few who did so should be granted the benefit of the doubt. However, given the fact that 18 of the 46 respondents who self-classified as above average (see table C below) would classify as average or below average if classified on the basis of per capita expenditure alone, we decided to include some Self-reported SES information in our SES variable as a 'corrective'.

Reported occurrence of hunger during the past year

To have some control upon the correspondence between our SES classification and absolute levels of SES we also included information from a hunger question in our SES variable. As can be seen in table B, 158 respondents who would have classified as average or above according to per capita income reported having experienced hunger/having nothing to eat at least once during the last 12 months. We used this as a second 'corrective'.

SES classification rules

The decision rules for including a particular respondent household in a particular SES class are the following:

- If the respondent reports that his/her family has sometimes or regularly experienced hunger during the past 12 months the HH is classified as Below Average;
- If the respondent reports that his/her family's SES is above or well above average the HH is classified as Above Average;
- In all other cases, the HH is classified in line with the per capita expenditure classification.

These rules make for a simple and non-technical 'corrective' of the basic per capita expenditure variable. Table C below cross-tabulates the resulting SES classification with various other SES indicators.

Table C: Various SES indicators cross-tabulated**Various SES indicators cross-tabulated**

<i>Respondent N=2000</i>		<i>Per capita expenditure</i>			<i>Self-reported SES</i>			<i>Hunger</i>			<i>SES computed</i>			<i>Total</i>
		<i>Below average</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Above average</i>	<i>Poor</i>	<i>Not poor</i>	<i>Just on the line between poor and not poor</i>	<i>It Never happened</i>	<i>A few times</i>	<i>Always</i>	<i>Below average</i>	<i>Average</i>	<i>Above average</i>	
Per capita expenditure	<i>Below average</i>				505 (51%)	2 (4%)	293 (30%)	585 (36%)	143 (55%)	72 (64%)	798 (100%)	0 (0%)	2 (0%)	800 (40%)
	<i>Average</i>				354 (36%)	16 (35%)	430 (44%)	677 (42%)	91 (35%)	32 (28%)	123 (15%)	661 (83%)	16 (2%)	800 (40%)
	<i>Above average</i>				124 (13%)	28 (61%)	248 (26%)	365 (22%)	26 (10%)	9 (8%)	35 (9%)	0 (0%)	365 (91%)	400 (20%)
Self-reported SES	<i>Poor</i>	505 (63%)	354 (44%)	124 (31%)				680 (42%)	202 (78%)	101 (89%)	622 (65%)	265 (40%)	96 (25%)	983 (49%)
	<i>Not poor</i>	2 (0%)	16 (2%)	28 (7%)				46 (3%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	46 (12%)	46 (2%)
	<i>Just on the line between poor and not poor</i>	293 (37%)	430 (54%)	248 (62%)				901 (55%)	58 (22%)	12 (11%)	334 (35%)	396 (60%)	241 (63%)	971 (49%)
Hunger	<i>It Never happened</i>	585 (73%)	677 (85%)	365 (91%)	680 (69%)	46 (100%)	901 (93%)				583 (61%)	661 (100%)	383 (100%)	1627 (81%)
	<i>A few times</i>	143 (18%)	91 (11%)	26 (7%)	202 (21%)	0 (0%)	58 (6%)				260 (27%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	260 (13%)
	<i>Always</i>	72 (9%)	32 (4%)	9 (2%)	101 (10%)	0 (0%)	12 (1%)				113 (12%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)	113 (6%)
Motorized transport	<i>None</i>	568 (71%)	386 (48%)	120 (30%)	684 (70%)	8 (17%)	382 (39%)	812 (50%)	181 (70%)	81 (72%)	653 (68%)	315 (48%)	106 (28%)	1074 (54%)
	<i>2+3 wheels</i>	224 (28%)	373 (47%)	221 (55%)	282 (29%)	26 (57%)	510 (53%)	713 (44%)	74 (29%)	31 (27%)	289 (30%)	311 (47%)	218 (57%)	818 (41%)
	<i>4 or more wheels</i>	8 (1%)	41 (5%)	59 (15%)	17 (2%)	12 (26%)	79 (8%)	102 (6%)	5 (2%)	1 (1%)	14 (2%)	35 (5%)	59 (15%)	108 (5%)
Television	<i>Yes</i>	319 (40%)	525 (66%)	280 (70%)	397 (40%)	40 (87%)	687 (71%)	1011 (62%)	81 (31%)	32 (28%)	381 (40%)	459 (69%)	284 (74%)	1124 (56%)
	<i>No</i>	481 (60%)	275 (34%)	120 (30%)	586 (60%)	6 (13%)	284 (29%)	616 (38%)	179 (69%)	81 (72%)	575 (60%)	202 (31%)	99 (26%)	876 (44%)
Total		800 (40%)	800 (40%)	400 (20%)	983 (49%)	46 (2%)	971 (49%)	1627 (81%)	260 (13%)	113 (6%)	956 (48%)	661 (33%)	383 (19%)	2000

Table C enables us to assess how successful we are in the objective to maximize consistency between our SES classification and other indicators of SES:

- As is to be expected, the SES computed variable does not have any average and above average respondents anymore who report hunger, and no average or below respondents who self-classify as above average SES;
- The effect of the correctives is a 20% increase in the number of household classified as below average SES (from 800 to 956), a 17% decrease in the number of HH classified as average (from 800 to 661) and a nearly unchanged number of HH classified as above average. The resulting distribution is closer to a 3/6:2/6:1/6 than the 2/5:2/5:1/5 distribution aimed for with the per capita income variable. However, from a perspective of absolute poverty levels in Cambodia, identifying about half of the population as poor, about two-thirds of the remaining half as the country's 'middle class' and the remaining one-third of that half as the 'better off' makes sense;
- We have cross-tabulated the per capita expenditure variable with all other background variables (sex, rural/urban location, education, etc) and it behaves nearly the same as our computed SES variable. This signifies that although individual respondents HH/respondents have been moved into different classes, the overall make-up of the classes has not been changed by the correctives.
- As table B shows, the 'corrected' SES variable does not perform better in its interactions with some other SES indicators.

In summary, the correctives change the relative sizes of the three groups to proportions that do seem in line with Cambodian reality, without changing the correlations with other SES indicators, and without confounding the classification by altering the basic patterns of sex, age and rural/urban distributions.

Annex III

Income and Expenditure information compared

When designing the questionnaire we assumed that the standard very limited income probes used in corruption diagnostics can be improved upon. Obviously, increasing questionnaire time devoted to eliciting more comprehensive information on income *and expenditure* has consequences for what else can be asked. Does the quality of the income and expenditure information legitimize the loss of time that can be devoted to other questions?

Income information has two purposes in corruption diagnostics. It is used as a backgrounder to classify respondents into socio-economic status (SES) categories, and it is used as the basis for an indicator of the impact of corruption payments on the household economy. The former purpose only implies that the income information provided by the respondent correlates strongly with actual SES, the latter implies that the income information is reasonably accurate in absolute terms. Obviously, the latter assumption is much more questionable. Socio-economic household surveys normally do not rely on income but on expenditure information because reported expenditure is considered more accurate.

We have performed some analyses to shed light on the relationship between the income and expenditure information that our survey generated.

Normally corruption diagnostics will probe income with a single question. Given the livelihood reality of a large section of the Cambodian population we opted for a more extensive battery that requested respondents to report on cash income and non-cash income separately. In this sense our income measurement can already be expected to be more accurate. The difference between reported per capita cash income and reported per capita total income is considerable:

- Per capita cash income: mean = \$ 114, standard deviation = \$ 234
- Per capita total income: mean = \$ 164, standard deviation = \$ 248

All of the following is based on this more accurate cash + non-cash income.

An obvious first check on the relationship between per capita income and expenditure information is to calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient. As expected the two were statistically highly significantly related (0.543), but the correlation is all but impressive. So there is a need to explore the relationship between income and expenditure in more detail.

One strategy to find out more is to look at the difference between per capita income and expenditure. Normally income is more under-reported than expenditure. Does it show in our data? For the sake of this argument we will call the difference between the two 'savings'. It turned out that 93 percent of respondents reported *negative* savings, in other words reported more expenditure than income. A very clear confirmation of expenditure being, *in absolute terms*, a more realistic representation of household economy than income. Even with our more accurate income measurement that explicitly probed non-cash income.

Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that income cannot be used as an indicator of relative SES. As long as there is a proper linear relationship between the under-reported

income and other indicators of SES, income is a suitable shortcut to SES. If one divides both per capita income and per capita expenditure into 20-percentile groups and cross-tabulates ownership of assets with these groups, expenditure performs better. But not so much better that switching to the much more time consuming expenditure probes seems necessary if one wants to use income *only* as an indicator of relative SES.

Table D: Expenditure correlates better than income with assets

N=2000		TV		Ownership of means of transportation		
		No	Yes	None	2 to 3 wheels	4 or more wheels
Lowest 20%	Income	250	150	297	101	2
	Expenditure	274	126	325	75	-
21-40%	Income	218	182	270	125	5
	Expenditure	219	181	279	117	4
41-60%	Income	193	207	226	162	12
	Expenditure	168	232	227	162	11
61-80%	Income	133	267	180	195	25
	Expenditure	131	269	146	228	26
highest 20%	Income	82	318	101	235	64
	Expenditure	84	316	97	236	67

To better understand the not overly strong correlation between income and expenditure we explored the relationships between savings and expenditure and savings and income. When one cross-tabulates 20-percentile per capita savings and expenditures groups the pattern is very clear: the higher the expenditure the lower the saving, and the higher the saving the lower the expenditure. In other words, the higher the expenditure the smaller the under-reporting of income (table E).

But the same cross-tabulation for income shows that this linear relationship does not hold for savings and income. Although the picture in table F is less outspoken than for expenditure there is an obvious non-linear (U-shaped) relationship, with the higher incomes having both more than average low *and* high (negative) savings.

The combination of the two cross-tabulations offers a potential explanation for the relative low correlation between reported incomes and expenditures. Higher expenditures go very clearly together with increasingly matching incomes, but higher incomes do not necessarily mean matching expenditures. For part of the higher income reporting respondents reported expenditures do not match but are way higher. The two distributions are thus quite differently shaped.

Table E: The higher the expenditure the more realistic reported income

N=2000		Yearly per capita expenditure					Total
		lowest 20%	21-40%	41-60%	61-80%	highest 20%	
Yearly per capita savings	lowest 20%	-	-	1%	31%	68%	400
	21-40%	-	7%	43%	38%	13%	400
	41-60%	12%	44%	25%	14%	5%	400
	61-80%	45%	29%	14%	9%	4%	400
	highest 20%	43%	21%	17%	10%	10%	400
Total		400	400	400	400	400	2000

Table F: The relationship between income and savings is U-shaped

N=2000		Yearly per capita income					Total
		lowest 20%	21-40%	41-60%	61-80%	highest 20%	
Yearly per capita savings	lowest 20%	14%	14%	20%	26%	27%	400
	21-40%	22%	24%	19%	20%	15%	400
	41-60%	29%	27%	20%	13%	11%	400
	61-80%	26%	24%	23%	16%	11%	400
	highest 20%	9%	11%	19%	26%	36%	400
Total		400	400	400	400	400	2000

Whatever the explanation, the lesser validity of reported income as an indicator of the actual household economy seems evident. The better performance of the income variable regarding ownership of assets is not impressive. This means that using income as a short cut for *relative* SES is probably not that problematic. However, when the interest in indicators of absolute SES, reported income provides a seriously distorted the picture.

Another clear-cut indication of this distortion is provided by analyzing the ratios of savings and income and savings and expenditures. The yearly average per capita income is \$ 164, the yearly average per capita expenditure is \$ 344 and the yearly average per capita saving = - \$ 181. However, the differently shaped distributions of per capita income and per capita expenditure, and the resulting oddly distributed per capita savings create distributions of the ratios of savings and expenditures and savings and incomes that are quite different from what one would expect given the averages. The average for expenditures would suggest an average ratio close to - 0.5 and the average for income would suggest an average ratio close to zero. The average ratio of savings and expenditures is indeed around - .05 (in line with the above described linear relationship), but the average ratio of savings and income is - 2.8 (see table G).

Table G: The average ratio of saving by income is huge

Percentile	Ratio saving by income	Ratio saving by expenditure
10	- 6.90	- 0.88
20	- 4.24	- 0.82
30	- 2.84	- 0.74
40	- 2.12	- 0.68
50	- 1.56	- 0.61
60	- 1.09	- 0.53
70	- 0.71	- 0.42
80	- 0.37	- 0.28
90	- 0.07	- 0.09
Mean	- 2.82	- 0.52
Standard deviation	5.81	0.41

Imagine what this means for calculations of e.g. the share of bribe payments as part of reported income. If one very conservatively assumes that reported income needs to be *at least* at the level of reported expenditure to accurately reflect reality, this ratio implies that a 1.4% share of bribes of expenditure represents at least a 3.9% share of reported income.

One can even go further and argue that because our income measure is more accurate than a single question income measure, and resulted in 44% more reported income by explicitly probing non-cash income, we may assume that a 1.4% share of bribes of expenditure represents a 5% share of reported cash income, the normal indicator for impact.

Obviously, this way of looking at the difference between our results and those of the 2000 World Bank diagnostic (2.2%) suggest that the impact of bribe payments was severely underestimated in the 2000 survey.

Annex IV

Occupation and its relationship with other background variables

We have recoded a long list of occupation codes into 7 broader categories:

Table H: Occupation categories

Categories	occupation codes
Housewife, not economically active	At school, too young, housewife, too old
Agricultural/ Natural resources	Own farm work, fisherman, common property resource gathering, charcoal making, resin gathering, palmjuice/sugar production
Small business	Transportation (moto-dup, roeumak, taxi,...), small business (grocery, repair shop, barber,...), self-employed seller, worker in hotel/restaurant, casino, shop
Skilled/ administration labor	Clerical/administrative works government/private sector, non-agricultural skilled labor (sewing, electrician, carpenter,...)
Day-labor/ Unskilled	Non-agricultural unskilled day labor, unskilled labor for government, recycling, farm work for others,
Professional , Manager, Entrepreneurs management government	Higher civil servants, managers private sector, entrepreneurs with more/less than 10 employees, professional/technical staff government/private sector
Others	Living of rentals, remittances, etc., others

Table I: Primary and secondary occupations of respondents, heads of HH, and all HH members

Occupations	Respondent		Head of HH		All HH member	
	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Secondary
Housewife, not economically active	11%	57%	7%	51%	49%	71%
Agricultural/ Natural resources	63%	12%	63%	14%	34%	13%
Small business	12%	12%	11%	12%	7%	6%
Skilled/ administration labor	6%	3%	9%	4%	5%	2%
Day-labor/ Unskilled	4%	14%	5%	15%	4%	7%
Professional , Manager, Entrepreneurs management government	3%	1%	5%	1%	2%	-
Others	1%	2%	1%	3%	1%	1%
Total	2000	2000	2000	2000	11298	11298

The profile of primary and secondary occupations of respondents and the Heads of their Households are very similar. This is to be expected if sampling (voter-age) adults.

Table J: Primary occupation respondents across rural and urban areas

	Respondent			
	Primary Occupation			
	Urban	Semi-Urban	Accessible-Rural	Remote-Rural
Housewife, not economically active	23%	14%	8%	6%
Agricultural/ Natural resources	17%	43%	76%	81%
Small business	31%	24%	6%	7%
Skilled/ administration labor	15%	9%	4%	2%
Day-labor/ Unskilled	4%	4%	4%	4%
Professional , Manager, Entrepreneurs management government	10%	3%	2%	-
Others	1%	2%	0%	1%
Total	325	210	1360	105

The spread of occupation across rural and urban areas shows the geographic bias of different kinds of work:

- Work connected to the land is concentrated in rural areas, but even for those living in semi-urban areas it is by far the most important source of income;
- Small business, skilled and administrative labor, and professionals are concentrated in urban areas;
- Day-labor and the associated poverty are equally spread across all areas;
- The proportion of economically not active respondents is highest in urban areas.

Table K: Primary occupation respondents by sex, educational attainment and socio-economic status of the HH

Occupation recode	Sex		Education attainment			SES computed		
	Male	Female	Lower	Middle	Higher	Below average	Average	Above average
Housewife, not economically active	8%	14%	8%	20%	14%	10%	11%	13%
Professional , Manager, Entrepreneurs management government	4%	2%	1%	6%	27%	2%	2%	9%
Skilled/ administration labor	8%	4%	3%	12%	24%	3%	8%	9%
Small business	9%	15%	11%	14%	20%	7%	14%	20%
Agricultural/ Natural resources	65%	61%	71%	46%	13%	72%	62%	44%
Day-labor/ Unskilled	5%	3%	5%	1%	2%	6%	3%	3%
Others	1%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	1%	2%
Total	1013	987	1477	438	85	956	661	383

When exploring the relationships between respondents' occupations and their sex, educational attainment and the socio-economic status of their HH, the following observation can be made:

- Females are under-represented in skilled/administrative labor but over-represented in small business;
- The better educated and the more well-off the HH the higher the percentage of professionals, skilled workers and small businesses;
- The lower educated and the worse off the household, the greater its dependence upon the land;
- (Individual) educational attainment is a stronger determinant of respondent occupation than (Household) socio-economic status.

Annex V

Additional Tables

Table 8A: What is currently the most serious problem in Cambodia? Differences across background variables

	Urban/ Rural				Sex		Age			Education attainment			SES computed			Total
	Urban	S-Urban	A-rural	R-Rural	M	F	18-25	26-44	45+	Lower	Middle	Higher	Below average	Average	Above average	
High cost of living/ poverty	45%	53%	52%	47%	41%	61%				54%	42%	45%	55%	49%	45%	51%
Bad road	13%	11%	12%	23%	16%	10%							11%	14%	15%	13%
Safety concerns/ crime	15%	11%	9%	10%	14%	7%				8%	16%	21%				11%
Poor quality of health care	10%	6%	5%	3%			9%	5%	4%	4%	10%	5%				6%
High cost of health care					6%	3%	4%	3%	7%							5%
Drug abuse/ traffic	4%	2%	2%	1%												2%
Illegal immigration	3%	5%	8%	7%						7%	7%	2%				7%
Total	325	210	1360	105	1013	987	440	924	636	1477	438	85	956	661	383	2000

Table 9A: Quality of Service. Aware scores by background variable

DK	Urban/ Rural				Sex		Age			Education attainment			SES computed			Tot
	Urban	S-U	A-R	R-R	M	F	18-25	26-44	45+	Lower	Middle	Higher	Below average	Average	Above average	
<i>Public schools</i>	97%	98%	99%	94%	99%	98%	97%	99%	98%	98%	99%	100%	98%	99%	98%	98%
<i>Public health services providers</i>	98%	99%	96%	88%	97%	96%	94%	97%	97%	96%	99%	99%	96%	97%	97%	96%
<i>Private health services providers</i>	95%	98%	95%	93%	94%	96%	94%	95%	95%	95%	94%	100%	93%	96%	96%	95%
<i>Police excluding traffic police</i>	90%	93%	91%	86%	93%	89%	92%	91%	91%	90%	92%	95%	89%	93%	93%	91%
<i>Public registry</i>	89%	94%	91%	89%	92%	89%	89%	91%	91%	89%	94%	98%	88%	92%	94%	91%
<i>Traffic police</i>	90%	89%	79%	63%	86%	76%	78%	84%	79%	77%	92%	96%	75%	85%	90%	81%
<i>Judge/ courts</i>	87%	81%	78%	65%	82%	76%	76%	79%	81%	76%	87%	93%	75%	81%	86%	79%
<i>Land administration</i>	73%	84%	75%	77%	77%	74%	69%	76%	80%	75%	78%	80%	71%	79%	82%	76%
<i>Construction permit</i>	72%	69%	54%	53%	63%	54%	57%	59%	59%	56%	66%	74%	51%	64%	70%	59%
<i>Customs authority</i>	61%	54%	47%	30%	56%	42%	47%	49%	49%	43%	63%	74%	41%	52%	62%	49%
<i>Business small licensing</i>	55%	53%	39%	24%	45%	40%	41%	42%	44%	39%	51%	61%	32%	48%	55%	42%
<i>Private schools</i>	69%	49%	30%	23%	39%	36%	39%	34%	42%	32%	48%	74%	29%	43%	50%	38%
<i>Water services</i>	72%	34%	18%	10%	29%	28%	30%	27%	30%	22%	43%	66%	21%	31%	42%	28%
<i>Public electricity service</i>	71%	35%	15%	12%	28%	25%	29%	25%	27%	21%	39%	65%	21%	28%	39%	26%
<i>Private electricity service</i>	32%	57%	22%	12%	28%	24%	24%	26%	28%	23%	32%	48%	22%	25%	39%	26%
Total	325	210	1360	105	1013	987	440	924	636	1477	438	85	956	661	383	2000

Table 9B: Quality of Service. Relevant Net Opinion differences along background variables

N=2000	Urban/ Rural				Sex		Education attainment			SES computed			Total
	Urban	S-Urban	A-Rural	R-Rural	M	F	Lower	Middle	Higher	Below average	Average	Above average	
<i>Public health services provider</i>	-44%	-24%	-20%	-38%	-32%	-18%							-26%
<i>Public schools</i>	-11%	+11%	+18%	-3%			+14%	+7%	-11%	+20%	+6%	-	+12%
<i>Private schools</i>							+47%	+56%	+38%	+43%	+51%	+44%	+49%
<i>Public registry</i>	-20%	+1%	-5%	-7%									-8%
<i>Land administration</i>	-27%	+6%	+9%	-3%			+5%	-3%	-13%	+11%	-2%	-10%	+2%
<i>Construction permit</i>	-35%	+12%	+29%	+25%									+14%
<i>Police excluding traffic police</i>	-41%	-29%	-34%	-9%									-34%
<i>Judge/Courts</i>	-75%	-61%	-60%	-53%			-60%	-67%	-68%				-62%
Total	325	210	1360	105	1013	987	1477	438	85	956	661	383	2000

Table 10A: Situations of non-acceptable behaviors evaluated. Differences along background variables

N=2000	Urban/ Rural				Age			SES computed			Total
	Urban	Semi-Urban	Accessible-Rural	Remote-Rural	18-25	26-44	45+	Below average	Average	Above average	
A person visits a government office and receives good assistance from the officer in charge. When the matter is concluded, he offers 10,000 Riel which the government official accepts.	-10%	+1%	-16%	-26%	-1%	-13%	-22%	-17%	-11%	-9%	-14%
Total	325	210	1360	105	440	924	636	956	661	383	2000

Table 14A: What occurs in the majority of the cases when someone bribes an official? Age differences

N=2000	Age			Total
	18-25	26-44	45+	
The official asks for the bribe	16%	12%	11%	13%
<i>The household offers the bribe of its own accord</i>	34%	30%	27%	30%
<i>It is known beforehand how to bribe and how much to bribe, so it is not discussed</i>	9%	9%	10%	9%
<i>There is no middleman</i>	31%	37%	39%	36%
DK	10%	13%	14%	13%
Total	440	924	636	2000

Table 15A: How certain are Cambodians that a bribe is going to be effective? Differences along the rural/urban and educational attainment dimensions

N=2000	Urban/ Rural				Education attainment			Total
	Urban	Semi-Urban	Accessible-Rural	Remote-Rural	Lower	Middle	Higher	
If Someone offers a bribe in order to obtain a service or to solve a problem, how certain is the delivery of the service or the resolution of the problem after the bribe has been given?	+18%	+14%	+3%	-3%	+4%	+9%	+24%	+6%
Total	325	210	1360	105	1477	438	85	2000

Table16-28A: General attitudes and opinions. Differences along background variables

Net Opinion	Urban/ Rural				Sex		Age			Education attainment			SES computed			Total
	U	S-U	A-R	R-R	M	F	18-25	26-44	45+	Low	Middle	High	Below aver.	Aver.	Above aver.	
Corruption is a fact of life, it is the normal way doing things	+16	+14	-	+1	-	+9										+4
<i>You can't call something corruption if everyone is doing it.</i>							-37	-45	-56							-46
<i>Corruption gives better services</i>										+10	-4	+20				+7
<i>When people get small a salary it is OK for them to ask for bribes.</i>										-19	-11	+12				-16
<i>Female officials ask for bribes less than male officials or ask for lower amounts.</i>										+20	+11	+5	+25	+12	+10	+18
<i>Taking a big amount of money is more corrupt than taking a small amount of money</i>					-9	-	+7	-9	-7	-5	-6	+5				-5
<i>The amount paid depends on whether the person is poor or rich</i>										-19	-16	-12	-20	-21	-9	-18
<i>Kinship and friendship reduces the amount of a bribe necessary to get something</i>	+57	+56	+48	+50			+58	+47	+48	+49	+49	+71	+48	+46	+59	+50
<i>If I had the opportunity to take bribes I would accept them to support my family.</i>					-9	-21	-9	-16	-16	-18	-9	+6				-15
<i>When people get a small salary it is OK for them to ask for some tea money.</i>	+24	+31	+13	+14			+23	+20	+8	+13	+23	+39				+17
<i>Women are normally asked for higher bribes than men.</i>										-31	-29	-55				-32
<i>Paying official fees and following official procedures costs very much time.</i>	+81	+71	+70	+78	+76	+69				+70	+79	+82				+72
<i>The government has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption.</i>	-25	-20	-14	-7						-14	-20	-33	-11	-19	-23	-16
<i>When an official takes bribes I am only bothered when I can not negotiate the amount.</i>	+66	+51	+53	+42												+55
<i>When the household has to pay a bribe it is mostly a female member of the HH who deals with it.</i>	+24	+27	+22	+21	+19	+27				+25	+16	+20				+23
Total	325	210	1360	105	1013	987	440	924	636	1477	438	85	956	661	383	2000

Table 29A: Institutional integrity. Aware scores by background variables

Aware	Urban/ Rural				Sex		Age			Education attainment			SES computed			Tot
	Urban	S-U	A-R	R-R	M	F	18-25	26-44	45+	Low	Middle	Higher	Below average	Average	Above Aver.	
<i>Village chief</i>	98%	99%	99%	100%	99%	99%	99%	99%	99%	99%	99%	99%	99%	99%	99%	99%
<i>Commune administration</i>	97%	98%	98%	96%	98%	97%	97%	97%	98%	97%	98%	98%	96%	98%	99%	98%
<i>Public schools</i>	98%	97%	98%	96%	98%	98%	97%	98%	98%	98%	98%	100%	97%	98%	99%	98%
<i>Public hospitals</i>	99%	97%	95%	89%	97%	95%	94%	96%	96%	95%	98%	99%	95%	97%	96%	96%
<i>Your local pagoda</i>	93%	96%	96%	90%	96%	95%	94%	95%	96%	94%	97%	99%	95%	96%	96%	95%
<i>Private hospitals</i>	95%	97%	94%	92%	94%	94%	94%	93%	96%	93%	96%	95%	92%	95%	97%	94%
<i>Police excluding traffic police</i>	92%	94%	92%	87%	94%	90%	92%	91%	93%	91%	94%	95%	90%	92%	94%	92%
<i>Central government and Administration</i>	89%	89%	87%	85%	93%	82%	85%	87%	88%	85%	94%	96%	85%	88%	92%	87%
<i>Political parties</i>	84%	90%	86%	84%	91%	81%	83%	87%	87%	84%	92%	99%	85%	86%	88%	86%
<i>District administration</i>	88%	91%	86%	82%	90%	83%	85%	87%	87%	84%	92%	98%	83%	89%	89%	86%
<i>Judge/ court</i>	92%	83%	85%	73%	86%	84%	84%	85%	85%	82%	94%	91%	81%	87%	90%	85%
<i>National Election committee</i>	82%	86%	83%	76%	88%	78%	76%	84%	86%	81%	88%	95%	81%	86%	84%	83%
<i>Traffic police</i>	90%	89%	81%	61%	86%	78%	82%	83%	82%	78%	93%	96%	76%	86%	91%	82%
<i>Media (Radio, TV, Newspapers)</i>	84%	84%	81%	63%	88%	73%	78%	81%	82%	77%	89%	95%	76%	84%	85%	81%
<i>Provincial administration</i>	84%	89%	78%	74%	84%	76%	77%	80%	82%	77%	87%	95%	76%	83%	84%	80%
<i>NGOs</i>	76%	73%	75%	70%	79%	70%	69%	76%	76%	72%	81%	87%	71%	77%	79%	74%
<i>The military</i>	75%	76%	71%	61%	79%	64%	68%	71%	75%	69%	76%	85%	69%	73%	74%	71%
<i>Tax authority</i>	77%	79%	66%	52%	73%	63%	65%	71%	67%	63%	84%	87%	61%	74%	77%	68%
<i>Customs authority</i>	75%	70%	62%	46%	70%	58%	62%	64%	66%	58%	80%	86%	57%	69%	75%	64%
<i>National assembly</i>	63%	67%	61%	48%	68%	55%	54%	64%	63%	57%	71%	83%	57%	65%	66%	61%
<i>Office of council of ministers</i>	59%	59%	50%	40%	56%	47%	47%	54%	53%	47%	63%	79%	45%	57%	59%	52%
<i>Private schools</i>	71%	49%	33%	23%	42%	39%	42%	38%	43%	35%	50%	76%	32%	44%	53%	40%
<i>Senate</i>	45%	40%	36%	23%	45%	29%	34%	37%	39%	31%	51%	68%	32%	41%	44%	37%
<i>Electricity provider</i>	77%	56%	20%	15%	34%	31%	33%	32%	33%	26%	44%	79%	25%	35%	46%	32%
<i>Water service provider</i>	72%	33%	19%	11%	28%	29%	29%	28%	29%	22%	42%	68%	21%	32%	40%	28%
Total	325	210	1360	105	1013	987	440	924	636	1477	438	85	956	661	383	2000

Table 29B: Institutional integrity. Differences along background variables

Net Opinion	Urban/ Rural				Sex		Age			Education attainment			SES computed			Total
	Urban	S-U	A-R	R-R	M	F	18-25	26-44	45+	Low	Middle	High	Below average	Aver.	Above Aver.	
NGOs										+58	+63	+50	+62	+56	+56	+59%
Private schools										+39	+54	+28				+42%
Your local pagoda	+20	+38	+31	+20			+20	+34	+28							+29%
The military	+1	+21	+28	-13	+17	+26				+24	+16	-1	+29	+16	+8	+21%
Private hospitals	+18	+33	+20	-3	+25	+16							+17	+20	+26	+20%
Public schools	-15	+8	+19	+11						+16	+3	-12	+20	+8	-3	+12%
Water service provider	+10	+9	+4	-						+5	+15	-7	+6	+13	-1	+7%
National Election committee	-16	+13	+50	+4	-3	+8				-	+1	-11				+3%
Village chief	-21	-7	-8	-11	-15	-5				-9	-13	-2				-10%
Electricity provider	-15	-12	-5	-						-10	-6	-16	-15	-7	-7	-10%
Senate	-28	-20	-9	+8						-10	-19	-21	-12	-12	-17	-13%
Media (Radio, TV, Newspapers)	-25	-22	-9	-5	-17	-8	-4	-15	-16	-11	-14	-28	-8	-14	-21	-13%
National assembly					-26	-21				-23	-25	-32	-21	-26	-28	-24%
Public hospitals	-41	-29	-24	-45	-35	-22				-26	-34	-32	-25	-29	-35	-28%
Commune administration	-46	-31	-30	-29	-35	-7				-31	-38	-22				-32%
Political parties										-32	-43	-48	-33	-31	-48	-35%
Office of council of ministers	-44	-35	-37	-48	-41	-36							-34	-40	-44	-38%
District administration	-56	-38	-38	-38	-43	-38				-39	-47	-38				-41%
Central government and Administration	-57	-41	-37	-55	-46	-37				-39	-48	-49	-39	-42	-47	-42%
Provincial administration	-55	-43	-41	-42	-46	-41				-40	-53	-49	-40	-45	-49	-44%
Police excluding traffic police					-57	-52				-54	-60	-47				-55%
Traffic police	-65	-57	-36	-63						-58	-68	-52	-58	-60	-67	-61%
Tax authority	-74	-67	-66	-76												-68%
Judge/ court	-91	-71	-76	-70						-76	-82	-81				-77%
Customs authority	-86	-44	-82	-90												-83%
Total	325	210	1360	105	1013	987	440	924	636	1477	438	85	956	661	383	2000

Table 29C: Most dishonest institution. Relevant background differences.

N=2000	Urban/ Rural				Education attainment			SES computed			Total
	Urban	Semi-Urban	Accessible-Rural	Remote-Rural	Lower	Middle	Higher	Below average	Average	Above average	
Central government and Administration	25%	20%	18%	21%	18%	23%	31%				20%
Commune administration	11%	9%	16%	21%							14%
Tax authority					17%	23%	25%	17%	18%	23%	19%
Customs authority					27%	28%	41%	23%	29%	35%	28%
Police excluding traffic police	16%	21%	29%	26%	28%	22%	17%	29%	25%	20%	26%
Judge/ court	64%	47%	51%	44%	50%	59%	61%				53%
Total aware	302	203	1197	80	1266	423	83	828	597	347	

Table 30A: Ministry or agency considered most corrupt. Differences along background variables

N=1621	Urban/ Rural				Sex		Age			Education attainment			SES computed			Total %
	Urban %	S-U %	A-R %	R-R %	M %	F %	18-25 %	26-44 %	45+ %	Low %	Middle %	High %	Below aver. %	Aver. %	Above aver. %	
Ministry of Interior	49	49	59	61	56	56	59	59	52	58	54	38	58	57	51	56
Ministry of Justice	67	54	54	41	57	55	50	58	57	53	61	68	50	58	65	56
Ministry of Economy and Finance	55	50	44	27	50	41	47	47	44	41	57	66	40	50	53	46
Ministry of Health	21	26	26	31	22	28	24	27	23	26	24	17	28	24	21	25
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and fisheries	17	30	24	25	26	20	21	22	27	23	26	21	21	26	24	23
Ministry of Education, Youth and sports	18	17	11	3	12	14	14	12	14	11	15	29	12	12	16	13
Ministry of Commerce	2	3	3	-	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	2	2	3
Ministry of Defense	5	6	4	14	6	4	5	4	6	5	6	8	6	3	6	5
Total	289	172	1096	64	878	743	347	757	517	1129	408	84	725	565	331	1621

Table 37A: Payments for services actual average amounts

	Off + Unofficial							Bribe							Total	
	U/R				SES			U/R				SES			Off + Unoff	Bribe
	U	S-U	A-R	R-R	B A	A	AA	U	S-U	A-R	R-R	B A	A	AA		
Public electricity services	\$223	\$113	\$228		\$79.5	\$173	\$361.5	\$3	\$3	\$10		\$1.5	\$11	\$2.5	\$210	\$4
Private electricity services	\$106	\$89	\$65		\$61	\$80	\$99.5	\$18	\$108	\$8		\$61.5	\$18	\$4.5	\$82	\$30
Water	\$83.5	\$57.5	\$44	\$102	\$44	\$63	\$92.5	\$11		\$10.5		\$10.5		\$11	\$67	\$11
Public education	\$244	\$151.5	\$64	\$52.5	\$58.5	\$110	\$203	\$111	\$61	\$30	\$13	\$32	\$53	\$86	\$102.5	\$55 *
Private education	\$306	\$191.5	\$130.5	\$116	\$89.5	\$188.5	\$354.5	\$83		\$18		\$100	\$45		\$232.5	\$76
Public health services	\$33	\$41.5	\$25	\$21	\$15	\$23.5	\$75	\$49.5	\$15.5	\$8.5	\$1	\$11.5	\$6	\$32	\$27.5	\$15.5
Private health services	\$131	\$78	\$64.5	\$60	\$47.5	\$79	\$140.5	\$50		\$1		\$1.5	\$50		\$76	\$25.5
Public registry	\$38.5	\$2	\$3.5	\$3	\$2.5	\$11	\$21	\$22.5	\$7	\$4	\$2.5	\$3.5	\$8.5	\$14	\$9.5	\$8
business licensing	\$48.5	\$116.5	\$8.5	\$16	\$14.5	\$25.5	\$53.5	\$5	\$27.5	\$26		\$9	\$63.5	\$15	\$38	\$24.5
Land administration	\$141	\$9.5	\$4		\$9	\$2.5	\$69	\$43	\$68.5	\$6.5	\$8.5	\$14	\$35	\$17.5	\$24.5	\$20.5
Construction permit	\$97		\$4.5		\$37.5	\$53.5	\$69	\$29		\$7.5		\$19	\$10	\$35.5	\$55	\$24
Traffic police	\$16.5	\$9	\$10	\$1.5	\$6.5	\$11	\$15.5	\$97	\$17	\$22	\$101.5	\$12.5	\$7	\$122.5	\$11	\$53.5
Police excluding traffic police	\$38.5	\$31.5	\$22.5	\$7	\$18	\$46	\$23	\$173.5	\$154	\$44	\$70	\$41	\$92.5	\$88	\$25.5	\$72.5
Customs	\$59	\$150.5	\$22.5		\$11	\$39	\$47.5	\$75	\$300.5	\$27	\$44	\$24	\$41.5	\$179	\$34.5	\$90
Judge/Courts	\$243.5	\$81.5	\$820		\$1563	\$65.5	\$105	\$308.5	\$275	\$423	\$12.5	\$139.5	\$138.5	\$658	\$578	\$357.5
Total	\$1809	\$1122.5	\$1516.5	\$379	\$2057	\$971	\$1730	\$1079	\$1037	\$646	\$253	\$481	\$579.5	\$1265.5	\$1573.5	\$867.5

* This figure differs from the amount reported in Table 38B in the main text because this is an aggregate of monthly and yearly bribe amounts. One out of nine respondents reporting paying bribes for public education only paid occasional bribes. The lower average amounts of these are aggregated into this total average actual bribe figure.

Table 37B: Number of respondent households paying for particular services: official costs & bribe payments

	Off Costs & Bribe payments													Total		
	U/R							SES						Official Costs	Bribes	
	U		S-U		A-R		R-R	B A		A		AA				
Public electricity services	206	14	29	1	5	2			60	3	103	3	77	11	240	17
Private electricity services	42	1	62	1	56	3			45	2	57	1	58	2	160	5
Water	229	3	57		147	1	3		124	1	176		136	3	436	4
Public education	237	130	153	59	974	271	68	23	677	173	491	181	264	129	1432	483
Private education	146	8	49		83	1	3		58	5	114	4	109		281	9
Public health services	86	14	55	5	426	59	29	4	300	40	200	20	96	22	596	82
Private health services	290	1	188		1267	1	97		868	1	619	1	355		1842	2
Public registry	70	32	52	13	259	108	23	10	178	67	137	55	89	41	404	163
business licensing	20	1	10	2	31	9	3		11	5	20	3	33	4	64	12
Land administration	11	6	11	3	54	17		3	32	10	22	7	22	12	76	29
Construction permit	6	10			5	3			2	3	6	4	3	6	11	13
Traffic police	34	37	15	11	59	45	9	4	37	20	38	39	42	38	117	97
Police excluding traffic police	7	12	8	3	28	51	3	7	20	27	9	28	17	18	46	73
Customs	4	1	2	5	27	15		2	8	7	16	7	9	9	33	23
Judge/Courts	3	6	2	1	7	11		1	4	4	4	7	4	8	12	19
Total	325		210		1360		105		956		661		383		2000	

Annex VI

CITIZEN'S FEEDBACK SURVEY ON INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY AND FORMAL AND INFORMAL COSTS

Good morning/afternoon, I am _____ with the Center for Advanced Study in Phnom Penh. May I please speak with _____? We are conducting a public opinion survey throughout Cambodia, and we would like to ask you a few questions about your views on various services and their associated costs. You have been randomly selected to be interviewed, and it is an honor to be selected. Your answers are completely confidential, we will not tell anyone how you answered these questions, and we would appreciate your cooperation.

Q.1: Classification of the commune: (scored by enumerator)

		Frequency	Percent
1	Urban	325	16
2	Semi-urban	210	11
3	Accessible rural	1360	68
4	Remote rural	105	5
Total		2000	100

Q.2: Classification of village: village is part of the population center or remote? (Scored by enumerator)

VILLAGE WITHIN POPULATION CENTER	1
ACCESSIBLE RURAL	2
REMOTE	3

II ICE-BREAKERS

Q. 3-16: I will now read to you a list of Problems in Cambodia. Which is currently the most serious problem in Cambodia?

[RANDOM ORDER]	Most serious *
Q. 3 High cost of living/poverty	1019 (51%)
Q. 4 Bad roads	254 (13%)
Q. 5 Safety concerns/crime	209 (11%)
Q. 6 Political instability	16 (1%)
Q. 7 Corruption in the public sector	28 (1%)
Q. 8 Corruption in the private sector	18 (1%)
Q. 9 Poor quality of education	26 (1%)
Q. 10 High cost of education	53 (3%)
Q. 11 Poor quality of health care	110(6%)
Q. 12 High cost of health care	94 (5%)
Q. 13 Drug abuse/traffic	41 (2%)
Q. 14 Illegal immigration	132 (7%)
Q. 15 Land conflicts	0 (0%)
Q. 16 Conflicts about access to fish Waters and forests	0 (0%)
Total	2000

III QUALITY OF SERVICES

Qs. 17-31		We would like to ask you about the QUALITY of various service providers. Do you think the overall quality of the services is VERY POOR, POOR, NEITHER POOR NOR GOOD, GOOD OR VERY GOOD?						
[SHOWCARD; RANDOM ORDER]	Very poor	Poor	Neither poor nor good	Good	Very good	DK	Total	
Q. 17 Public health services providers	253 (13%)	599 (30%)	715 (36%)	341 (17%)	20 (1%)	72 (4%)	2000	
Q. 18 Private health services providers	54 (3%)	258 (13%)	659 (33%)	889 (46%)	41 (2%)	99 (5%)	2000	
Q. 19 Public schools	107 (5%)	410 (21%)	705 (35%)	663 (33%)	79 (4%)	36 (2%)	2000	
Q. 20 Private schools	13 (1%)	57 (3%)	245 (12%)	417 (21%)	22 (1%)	1246 (62%)	2000	
Q. 21 Public registry (Birth & marriage certificate, Civil reg. ID, Passport...)	152 (8%)	496 (25%)	653 (33%)	465 (23%)	46 (2%)	188 (9%)	2000	
Q. 22 Business licensing	68 (3%)	292 (15%)	354 (18%)	125 (6%)	8 (0%)	1153 (58%)	2000	
Q. 23 Land administration	113 (6%)	351 (18%)	555 (28%)	400 (20%)	96 (5%)	485 (24%)	2000	
Q. 24 Construction permit	70 (4%)	246 (12%)	380 (19%)	384 (19%)	95 (5%)	825 (41%)	2000	
Q. 25 Traffic police	258 (13%)	555 (28%)	549 (28%)	242 (12%)	18 (1%)	378 (19%)	2000	
Q. 26 Police excluding traffic police	302 (15%)	619 (31%)	593 (30%)	296 (15%)	12 (1%)	178 (9%)	2000	
Q. 27 Customs authority	287 (14%)	434 (22%)	192 (10%)	59 (3%)	7 (0%)	1021 (51%)	2000	
Q. 28 Judge/Courts	524 (26%)	606 (30%)	309 (16%)	130 (7%)	14 (1%)	417 (21%)	2000	
Q. 29 Water Services	26 (1%)	90 (5%)	252 (13%)	183 (9%)	17 (1%)	1432 (72%)	2000	
Q. 30 Public electricity services	34 (2%)	116 (6%)	232 (12%)	138 (7%)	10 (1%)	1470 (73%)	2000	
Q. 31 Private electricity services	34 (2%)	93 (5%)	233 (12%)	151 (8%)	18 (1%)	1471 (73%)	2000	

IV. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM: VOCABULARY AND EVALUATION

Qs. 32-39		I'm going to describe some situations that sometimes happen in Cambodia and many other countries. Can you tell me how acceptable you think the described behavior is? VERY ACCEPTABLE, ACCEPTABLE, NEITHER ACCEPTABLE NOR UNACCEPTABLE, UNACCEPTABLE OR VERY UNACCEPTABLE						
[SHOWCARD; RANDOM ORDER]	Very acceptable	Acceptable	Neither acceptable nor unacceptable	Unacceptable	Very unacceptable	Don't know	Total	
Q. 32 To avoid having to visit the police station and pay a full fine, a traffic offender offers to pay 5,000 Riel directly to a traffic policeman. The policeman did not ask for the money, but accepted it.	6 (0%)	44 (2%)	111 (6%)	621 (31%)	1190 (60%)	28 (1%)	2000	
Q. 33 A person visits a government office, and receives good assistance from the officer in charge. When the matter is concluded, he offers 10,000 Riel which the government official accepts.	242 (12%)	470 (24%)	287 (14%)	494 (25%)	484 (24%)	23 (1%)	2000	

Q. 34 A person needs some service from a government department. The officer in charge deliberately takes his time. The person gives the officer money (4,000 – 20,000 Riel) to speed up the work and to reward the officer for his efforts.	18 (1%)	52 (3%)	146 (7%)	506 (25%)	1263 (63%)	15 (1%)	2000
Q. 35 A government official takes paper and pencils from the office to use at home	12 (1%)	45 (2%)	102 (5%)	640 (32%)	1173 (59%)	28 (1%)	2000
Q. 36 A person is promoted because he is the relative or protégé of a senior officer	16 (1%)	25 (1%)	82 (4%)	401 (20%)	1446 (72%)	30 (1%)	2000
Q. 37 An official pays money to get promotion	11 (1%)	15 (1%)	43 (2%)	312 (16%)	1601 (80%)	18 (1%)	2000
Q. 38 The court decides not to prosecute an offender because he comes from an influential family	3 (0%)	3 (0%)	12 (1%)	201 (10%)	1769 (89%)	12 (1%)	2000
Q. 39 A political party offers to pay money if you vote for them in the next election	7 (0%)	28 (1%)	122 (6%)	339 (17%)	1474 (74%)	30 (1%)	2000

Qs. 40-44	I'm going to describe several explanations that people who made unofficial payments gave for doing so. For each explanation, can you tell me how you would call the unofficial payment?										Total
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
Q. 40 The unofficial payment improved the quality of the service	24 (1%)	406 (20%)	1147 (57%)	55 (3%)	53 (3%)	25 (1%)	75 (4%)	14 (1%)	2 (0%)	199 (10%)	2000 (20%)
Q. 41 Without the unofficial payment no service would have been provided at all	35 (2%)	563 (28%)	953 (48%)	25 (1%)	14 (1%)	14 (1%)	25 (1%)	5 (0%)	1 (0%)	365 (18%)	2000 (20%)
Q. 42 The official involved was underpaid and needed additional income	29 (2%)	495 (25%)	798 (40%)	14 (1%)	84 (4%)	12 (1%)	42 (2%)	160 (8%)	20 (1%)	346 (17%)	2000 (20%)
Q. 43 The official fee was higher than the unofficial payment	84 (4%)	609 (31%)	779 (39%)	17 (1%)	2 (0%)	6 (0%)	6 (0%)	1 (0%)	4 (0%)	492 (25%)	2000 (20%)
Q. 44 The unofficial payment was done to express thanks for the service delivered	5 (0%)	135 (7%)	417 (21%)	14 (1%)	93 (5%)	22 (1%)	1051 (53%)	16 (1%)	18 (1%)	229 (12%)	2000 (20%)
Total	177 (2%)	2208 (22%)	4094 (41%)	125 (1%)	246 (2%)	79 (1%)	1199 (12%)	196 (2%)	45 (0%)	1631 (16%)	10000

Code: 1= Extortion; 2 = Corruption; 3 = Bribery; 4 = Payments to arrange services provision;
5 = Payment to encourage service provision; 6 = Tips after service; 7 = Gifts after service;
8 = Financial contribution; 9 = Unsolicited gifts expressing kindness; 10 = DK;

V INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

Q.45: Please estimate your total monthly HOUSEHOLD INCOME during the past twelve months EXCLUDING ANY INCOME FROM CROPS YOU PRODUCED, ANIMALS YOU RAISED, NFTP THAT YOU COLLECTED AND NON-COMMERCIAL FISHING ____ (Open ended)

Q. 46-94: Common property resources gathering and home produce for family consumption & selling WE ARE NOW GOING TO ASK YOU ABOUT THE CROPS YOUR HOUSEHOLD PRODUCED, ANIMALS YOU RAISED, NFTP THAT YOU COLLECTED AND NON-COMMERCIAL FISHING

- (1) How much did you collect during the last twelve months?
- (2) What is the value of that
- (3) How much costs did you have to make to produce this
- (4) **IN THE OFFICE:** calculate the Net value

Items description	From where	Yearly amount	Monetary value	Input costs	Net value
Q. 46-49 Vegetable/fruits	Forest				
Q. 50-53 Wild life	Forest				
Q. 54-57 House construction material	Forest				
Q. 58-61 Resin	Forest				
Q. 62-65 Rice	Home				
Q. 66-69 Maize, beans or other crops	Home				
Q. 70-73 Vegetable/fruits	Home				
Q. 74-77 Chicken/duck (ONLY IF CONSUMED OR SOLD)	Home				
Q. 78-81 Pig/cow (ONLY IF CONSUMED OR SOLD)	Home				
Q. 82-85 Fish	Sea/River/lake				
Q. 86-89 Rattan/Bamboo/Fire wood	Forest				
Q. 90-93 Others:(Specify)					
Q. 94 TOTAL NET VALUE					

FOR INTERVIEWERS:

WHEN ASKING ABOUT YEARLY PRODUCTION EXPLICITLY INDICATE THAT BOTH DRY AND WET SEASONS ARE TO BE INCLUDED

WHEN ASKING ABOUT PRODUCTION COSTS FOR ALL CROPS, DRAW ATTENTION TO: SEED (LINGS), MANURE, FERTILISER, PESTICIDES, FUEL, HIRED LABOR OR ANIMALS, IRRIGATION CHARGES, TRANSPORTATION OF INPUT; RENTALS PAID (IN KIND)

FOR ANIMALS DRAW ATTENTION TO: FEED, HIRED LABOR, VETERINARY SERVICES, TRANSPORT COSTS

Q. 95: TO BE CALCULATED IN THE OFFICE: TOTAL YEARLY HH INCOME.....

Q. 96-104: How much did your Household spend on the following food items in the PAST 7 DAYS? If the household did not have to buy the food items, please tell us how much it would have costs you to buy it

Qs.	Expenditure Items	Value in Riel
96	Rice and other staples like maize, noodles, etc	
97	Meat	
98	Fish	
99	Vegetables and fruits	
100	Cooking ingredients, spices, oils, sauces	
101	Tobacco products	
102	Beverages, including tea, coffee	
103	Other food products	
104	TOTAL per WEEK [IN THE OFFICE]	

Q. 105-147 How much did your Household spend on the following non- food items in the past MONTH? If the household did not have to buy the items, please tell us how much it would have costs you to buy it

Qs.	Expenditure Items	Official cost	Unofficial costs replacing official fees but not more expensive	Gifts	Unofficial fees, Bribes, beyond what something should cost	Frequency of contact	How often Bribes solicited	Total Cost
105	Fuel	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
106	Communication	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
107	Personal care (soap, hair-cut, make-up...)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
108	Products for use in the house	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
109	Eating out and other entertainment	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
110	Transportation	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
111	Non-electric lighting	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
112	Public electricity service							
113-119	Private electricity service							
120-126	Water							
127-133	Education (regular expenses: pay for extra courses, various fees, eating at school,...) PUBLIC							
134-140	Education (regular expenses: pay for extra courses, various fees, eating at school,...) PRIVATE							
141-147	TOTAL per MONTH [IN THE OFFICE]							

Q. 148-245: How much did your Household spend on the following non- food items in the past YEAR? If the household did not have to buy the items, please tell us how much it would have costs you to buy it

Qs.	Expenditure Items	Official cost	Unofficial costs replacing official fees but not more expensive	Gifts	Unofficial fees, Bribes, beyond what something should cost	Frequency of contact	How often Bribes solicited	Total
148	Cloths and footwear	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
149	House maintenance and repair	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
150	House rent	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
151	Land rent	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
152	Entertainment (tourist travel, ...)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
153	Social and religious ceremonies	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
154	Donation to others (relatives, contributions)	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	
155-161	Education (Occasional expenses: admission, examination,...) PUBLIC							
162-168	Education (Occasional expenses: admission, examination,...) PRIVATE							
169-175	Healthcare/treatment/ medicine PUBLIC							
176-182	Healthcare/treatment/ medicine PRIVATE							
183-189	Public registry (Birth & Marriage certificate, Civil reg., ID, Passport...)							
190-196	Business licensing							
197-203	Land administration							
204-210	Construction permit							
211-217	Traffic police							
218-224	Police excluding traffic police							
225-231	Customs authority							
232-238	Judge/Courts							
239-245	TOTAL per YEAR [IN THE OFFICE]							

VI MECHANICS OF CORRUPTION: GENERAL

Q. 246: What occurs in the majority of the cases when someone makes a gift to an official?

		Frequency	Percent
1	The official asks for the gift	148	7
2	The household offers the gift of its own accord	917	46
3	It is known beforehand how to give and how much to give, so	167	8
4	There is a middleman	340	17
5	Don't know	428	22
Total		2000	100

Q. 247: What occurs in the majority of the cases when someone bribes an official?

		Frequency	Percent
1	The official asks for the gift	251	13
2	The household offers the gift of its own accord	596	30
3	It is known beforehand how to give and how much to give, so	183	9
4	There is a middleman	721	36
5	Don't know	249	13
Total		2000	100

Q. 248: If someone offers a bribe in order to obtain a service or to solve a problem, how certain is the delivery of the service or the resolution of the problem after the bribe has been given?

		Frequency	Percent
1	Completely certain	417	21
2	Somewhat certain	383	19
3	Neither certain nor uncertain	485	24
4	Somewhat uncertain	478	24
5	Completely uncertain	201	10
6	Don't know	36	2
Total		2000	100

VII GENERAL ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS REGARDING CORRUPTION

Q.249-263: Do you STRONGLY AGREE, SOMEWHAT AGREE, NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE, SOMEWHAT DISAGREE, or STRONGLY DISAGREE with the following (random order)?

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	Don't know	Total
Q249	Corruption is a fact of life, it is the normal way of doing things	362 (18%)	502 (25%)	248 (12%)	300 (15%)	485 (24%)	103 (5%)	2000
Q250	You can't call something corruption if everyone is doing it	98 (5%)	281 (14%)	235 (12%)	533 (27%)	705 (35%)	148 (7%)	2000
Q251	Corruption gives better service	466 (23%)	472 (24%)	173 (9%)	270 (14%)	533 (27%)	86 (4%)	2000
Q252	When people get small a salary it is OK for them to ask for bribes	232 (12%)	416 (21%)	339 (17%)	425 (21%)	533 (27%)	55 (3%)	2000
Q253	Female officials ask for bribes less often than male officials or ask for lower amounts	272 (14%)	637 (32%)	460 (23%)	326 (16%)	242 (12%)	63 (3%)	2000
Q254	Taking a big amount of money is more corrupt than taking a small amount of money	418 (21%)	418 (21%)	171 (9%)	382 (19%)	546 (27%)	65 (3%)	2000
Q255	The amount paid depends on whether the person is poor or rich	252 (13%)	401 (20%)	227 (11%)	375 (19%)	620 (31%)	125 (6%)	2000
Q256	Kinship and friend reduces the amount of a bribe necessary to get something done	630 (32%)	706 (35%)	242 (12%)	152 (8%)	218 (11%)	52 (3%)	2000
Q257	If I had the opportunity to take bribes I would accept them to support my family	258 (13%)	448 (22%)	267 (13%)	364 (18%)	630 (32%)	33 (2%)	2000
Q258	When people get a small salary it is OK for them to ask for some tea money	314 (16%)	613 (31%)	300 (15%)	297 (15%)	320 (16%)	156 (8%)	2000
Q259	Women are normally asked for higher bribes than men	145 (7%)	245 (12%)	527 (26%)	619 (31%)	372 (19%)	92 (5%)	2000
Q260	Paying official fees and following official procedures costs very much time	852 (43%)	703 (35%)	146 (7%)	74 (4%)	114 (6%)	111 (6%)	2000
Q261	The government has a sincere desire and will to combat corruption	255 (13%)	302 (15%)	386 (19%)	363 (18%)	482 (24%)	212 (11%)	2000
Q262	When an official takes bribes I am only bothered when I cannot negotiate the amount down to a reasonable level	498 (25%)	753 (38%)	259 (13%)	146 (7%)	128 (6%)	216 (11%)	2000
Q263	When the household has to pay a bribe it is mostly a female member of the HH who deals with it	399 (20%)	559 (28%)	439 (22%)	346 (17%)	172 (9%)	85 (4%)	2000

VIII PERCEPTIONS OF INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRITY

Qs. 264-288	I would like to ask you about the integrity of various institutions. Please if you think each of the following is VERY HONEST, HONEST, NEITHER HONEST NOR DISHONEST, SOMEWHAT DISHONEST OR VERY DISHONEST
Qs. 289-291	Can you tell me which institution you consider to be the MOST DISHONEST, and the SECOND MOST DISHONEST, and the THIRD MOST DISHONEST?

[RANDOM ORDER]		Very honest	Somewhat honest	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat dishonest	Strongly dishonest	Don't know	Most dishonest 289-291 *
Q264	Office of Council of ministers	22 (1%)	119 (6%)	358 (18%)	352 (18%)	188 (9%)	961 (48%)	134 (8%)
Q265	Political parties	30 (2%)	157 (8%)	747 (37%)	593 (30%)	197 (10%)	276 (14%)	169 (10%)
Q266	National Assembly	48 (2%)	201 (10%)	437 (22%)	413 (21%)	131 (7%)	770 (38%)	75 (4%)
Q267	Central government and administration	49 (3%)	181 (9%)	560 (28%)	609 (31%)	346 (17%)	255 (13%)	351 (20%)
Q268	Provincial administration	23 (1%)	184 (9%)	489 (25%)	643 (32%)	260 (13%)	401 (20%)	150 (9%)
Q269	District administration	25 (1%)	207 (10%)	556 (28%)	668 (33%)	273 (14%)	271 (13%)	147 (8%)
Q270	Commune administration	37 (2%)	307 (15%)	634 (32%)	695 (35%)	279 (14%)	48 (2%)	253 (14%)
Q271	Village chief	91 (5%)	463 (23%)	680 (34%)	511 (26%)	238 (12%)	17 (1%)	181 (10%)
Q272	Tax authority	10 (1%)	74 (4%)	267 (13%)	513 (26%)	507 (25%)	629 (31%)	331 (19%)
Q273	Customs authority	4 (0%)	25 (1%)	161 (8%)	477 (24%)	619 (31%)	714 (36%)	489 (28%)
Q274	Traffic police	12 (1%)	111 (6%)	404 (20%)	707 (35%)	413 (21%)	353 (18%)	301 (17%)
Q275	Police excluding traffic police	7 (0%)	150 (8%)	515 (26%)	749 (38%)	415 (21%)	164 (8%)	460 (26%)
Q276	The military	148 (7%)	475 (24%)	477 (24%)	217 (11%)	112 (6%)	571 (29%)	48 (3%)
Q277	Judge/court	10 (1%)	49 (2%)	266 (13%)	550 (28%)	825 (41%)	300 (15%)	937 (53%)
Q278	Electricity provider	13 (1%)	141 (7%)	279 (14%)	173 (9%)	43 (2%)	1351 (68%)	26 (2%)
Q279	Water service provider	21 (1%)	143 (7%)	280 (14%)	103 (5%)	21 (1%)	1432 (72%)	13 (1%)
Q280	Public schools	128 (6%)	663 (33%)	602 (30%)	438 (22%)	126 (6%)	43 (2%)	100 (6%)
Q281	Private schools	44 (2%)	396 (20%)	265 (13%)	91 (5%)	11 (1%)	1193 (60%)	11 (1%)
Q282	Public hospitals	42 (2%)	334 (17%)	621 (31%)	630 (32%)	291 (15%)	82 (4%)	392 (22%)
Q283	Private hospitals	56 (3%)	756 (38%)	630 (32%)	369 (19%)	72 (4%)	117 (6%)	71 (4%)
Q284	Media (Radio, TV, Newspapers)	59 (3%)	327 (16%)	633 (32%)	487 (24%)	107 (5%)	387 (19%)	60 (3%)
Q285	NGOs	291 (15%)	708 (35%)	365 (18%)	115 (6%)	10 (1%)	511 (26%)	12 (1%)
Q286	Your local pagoda	313 (16%)	717 (36%)	395 (20%)	412 (21%)	66 (3%)	97 (5%)	40 (2%)
Q287	Senate	33 (2%)	151 (8%)	279 (14%)	219 (11%)	63 (3%)	1255 (63%)	12 (1%)
Q288	National Election Commission	133 (7%)	473 (24%)	492 (25%)	329 (17%)	236 (12%)	337 (17%)	174 (10%)

Codes

* DK/RA=0; Most dishonest=1; second most dishonest=2; third most dishonest=3

Q. 292-294: If you think about corruption at the level of the central government, which body or ministry comes to mind FIRST, which SECOND and which THIRD?

Number of responds, Percentage of respondents		1 st most corrupt Ministry	2 nd most corrupt Ministry	3 rd most corrupt Ministry
1	Council of Ministers	103 (6%)	36 (3%)	24 (2%)
2	Ministry of Economy and Finance	311 (19%)	258 (19%)	176 (18%)
3	Ministry of Interior	357 (22%)	364 (26%)	192 (19%)
4	Ministry of Defense	22 (1%)	28 (2%)	31 (3%)
5	Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries	136 (8%)	127 (9%)	115 (12%)
6	Ministry of Land management	4 (0%)	10 (1%)	10 (1%)
7	Ministry of Public Works and Transport	2 (0%)	8 (1%)	7 (1%)
8	Ministry of Water Resources	3 (0%)	1 (0%)	4 (0%)
9	Ministry of Commerce	13 (8%)	11 (1%)	22 (2%)
10	Ministry Education, youth and sports	63 (4%)	54 (4%)	90 (9%)
11	Ministry of Health	138 (9%)	148 (11%)	118 (12%)
12	Ministry of Justice	443 (27%)	304 (22%)	159 (16%)
13	Ministry of Social Affairs	6 (0%)	7 (1%)	4 (0%)
14	Ministry of Cults & Religion	4 (0%)	3 (0%)	3 (0%)
15	Ministry of Culture	0 (0%)	2 (0%)	4 (0%)
16	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	1 (0%)	5 (0%)	4 (0%)
17	Ministry of Industry, Mines & Energy	1 (0%)	7 (1%)	5 (0%)
18	Ministry of Environment	6 (0%)	1 (0%)	1 (0%)
19	Ministry of Rural Development	1 (0%)	5 (0%)	9 (1%)
20	Ministry of Posts & Telecommunications	2 (0%)	2 (0%)	4 (0%)
21	Ministry of Tourism	5 (0%)	2 (0%)	5 (0%)
Total		1621	1383	987

IX OPINIONS REGARDING PRIORITIES IN THE FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

Q. 295-296: If you were in a position of authority and you could do something about corruption in Cambodia, which corruption/ corruption in which sector would you target FIRST, and which NEXT?

Q.295:

Category label	Count	Pct of Responses
Royal Government of Cambodia	48	3.0
Ministry of Wildlife and Fishery	126	7.9
Ministry of Health	96	6.0
Police	291	18.1
Council Ministry	37	2.3
Courts/Judges	401	25.0
Ministry of Economy and Finance	262	16.3
Prime Minister	6	.4
Ministry of Justice	28	1.7
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports	56	3.5
Local authorities	77	4.8
Ministry of National Defense	10	.6
Ministry of Interior	32	2.0
Political party	6	.4
Ministry of Land Management, Construction	2	.1
National Election Committee	5	.3

Women and Drug Trafficking-anti-unit	74	4.6
Illegal migrants-anti-unit	22	1.4
National Assembly	3	.2
Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts	3	.2
Ministry of Cults and Religious Affairs	1	.1
Ministry of Environment	3	.2
Ministry of Tourism	2	.1
Ministry of Information	1	.1
Ministry of Commerce	5	.3
Ministry of Social Affairs, Vocational T	1	.1
Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy	2	.1
Ministry of Public Work and Transportation	1	.1
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International	1	.1
Child Labor-anti-unit	2	.1
	-----	-----
Total responses	1604	100.0

Q.296:

Category label	Count	Pct of Responses
Ministry of Interior	33	2.6
Ministry of Economy and Finance	224	17.6
Ministry of Health	126	9.9
Police/Military	247	19.4
Local Authorities (village/commune chief	89	7.0
Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports	58	4.5
Ministry of Agriculture, Wildlife and Fish	110	8.6
Royal Government of Cambodia	13	1.0
Ministry of Justice	20	1.6
Women/Drug trafficking-anti-unit	58	4.5
Courts/Judges	228	17.9
Council of Ministers	15	1.2
Ministry of Social Affairs, Vocational T	1	.1
Political Party	5	.4
National Assembly	3	.2
Ministry of National Defense	6	.5
Ministry of Land Management, Construction	6	.5
Ministry of Tourism	2	.2
Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts	2	.2
Ministry of Commerce	5	.4
National Election Committee	3	.2
Child Labor-anti-unit	3	.2
Closure of Casino	1	.1
Ministry of Environment	3	.2
Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy	5	.4
Ministry of Public Work and Transportation	4	.3
Ministry of Rural Development	1	.1
Ministry of Telecommunication and Posts	1	.1
Ministry of Meteorology and Water Resource	2	.2
Ministry of Information	1	.1
	-----	-----
Total responses	1275	100.0

Q. 297-298: If you were in a position of authority and you could do something about corruption in Cambodia, what action would you take FIRST, and what would you do NEXT?

Q.297:

Category label	Count	Pct of Responses
Dismissal of corrupt officials from position	477	33.3
Corruption Law Dissemination	213	14.9
Corruption Law Enforcement	89	6.2
Changing of corrupt people's positions	25	1.7
Provision of high salary for civil servants	150	10.5
Adopting a law enforcement	202	14.1
Changing of leadership in the government	27	1.9
Recruitment of qualified people to take	22	1.5
Removal of partisanship in the government	12	.8
Declaration of officials 'property before	1	.1
Justice System Reforms	14	1.0
Sentencing corrupt people to imprisonment	198	13.8
Creation of work monitor committee	4	.3
	-----	-----
Total responses	1434	100.0

Q.298:

Category label	Count	Pct of Responses
Dismissal of corrupt officials from position	132	14.4
Corruption Law Dissemination	88	9.6
Corruption Law Enforcement	250	27.3
Changing of corrupt people's positions	183	20.0
Provision of high salary for civil servant	2	.2
Adopting a law enforcement	69	7.5
Changing of leadership in the government	123	13.4
Recruitment of qualified people to take	12	1.3
Removal of partisanship in the government	3	.3
Justice System Reforms	5	.5
Creation of work monitor committee	5	.5
Others	44	4.8
	-----	-----
Total responses	916	100.0

<u>Codes for Q. 02</u>	<u>Codes for Q.05</u>	<u>Codes for Q. 07</u>	<u>Codes for Q. 08</u>	<u>Codes for 9 & 10</u>	
Head=1 Wife or husband=2 Son or daughter=3 Son-in-law or daughter-in-law=4 Grandchildren=5 Parents=6 Parents-in-law=7 Brother/sister=8 Brother-in-law/sister-in-law=9 Nephew/niece=10 Other relatives=11 Adopted child/foster child=12 Do not know=97	Currently married=1 Separated=2 Widowed=3 Divorced=4 Never married=5	Primary incomplete=1 Primary complete=2 Lower secondary incomplete=3 Lower secondary complete=4 Higher secondary incomplete=5 Higher secondary complete=6 Professional diploma=7 Bachelor Degree=8 Master Degree=9 PhD=10 Never go to school=0	Disabled=1 Too old/young/infirm/retired=2 Only Study=3 Study and work=4 Only housekeeping=5 Wanting to work but unemployed=6 Working but underemployed=7 Working fulltime=8	Managers government (higher civil servant)=1 Managers private sector=2 Professional/technical government=3 Professional/technical private sector =4 Clerical/Administrative (office workers government)=5 Clerical/Administrative (office workers private sector)=6 Non-agricultural skilled (sewing, electrician, carpenter, construction, welding, tool-making, crafts)=7 Worker in hotel/restaurant/casino/ shop...)=8 Worker in entertainment (singer, dancer, etc.)=9 Transportation (moto-dup, roeumak, taxi,...)=10 Non-agricultural unskilled day-labor private sector=11 Unskilled labor for government=12 Recycling=13	Own farm work (cultivating crops, raising animals, fish culture) =14 Farm work for others=15 Fisherman=16 Common property resource gathering=17 Charcoal making, resin gathering, palmjuice/sugar making=18 Entrepreneurs with less than 10 employees=19 Entrepreneurs with 10 or more employees=20 Small business (grocery, repair shop, barber shop...)=21 Self-employed seller in market or village (prepared food, vegetables, etc....)=22 Begging=23 Living of rentals, remittances etc.=24 Other=25

XI EXPERIENCE WITH JOB APPLICATIONS

Q. 425: Did you or anyone else in your household apply for a job in a government office in the last five years?

		Frequency	Percent
1	Yes	31	2
2	No	1969	98
Total		2000	100

Qs: 426-457	Q. If yes, please tell me which member(s) of the Household did so, for what job, in which government office?
	Q. For each of these, please tell me if the applicant was asked for money

1: If yes, please tell me which member(s) of the Household apply for job? (line number for first member)

		Frequency	Percent
1	1	11	1
2	2	4	0
3	3	8	0
4	4	5	0
5	5	2	0
6	7	1	0
7	No answer	1969	99
Total		2000	100

2: If yes, please tell me which member(s) of the Household apply for job? (line number for 2nd member)

		Frequency	Percent
1	1	1	0
2	3	3	0
3	No answer	1996	100
Total		2000	100

3: If yes, please tell me which member(s) of the Household apply for job? (line number for 3rd member)

		Frequency	Percent
1	4	1	0
2	8	1	0
3	No answer	1998	100
Total		2000	100

A: Government office applied for 1st member

		Frequency	Percent
1	Council of Minister	1	0
2	Ministry of Economy and Finance	1	0
3	Ministry of Interior	4	0
4	Ministry of Public Work and Transportation	1	0
5	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports	15	1
6	Ministry of Social Affairs, Vocational Training and Youth	1	0
7	Ministry of Information	1	0
8	Ministry of Rural Development	1	0
9	The Senate	1	0
10	No answer	1974	99
Total		2000	100

B: Government office applied for 2nd member

		Frequency	Percent
1	Council of Minister	1	0
2	Ministry of Economy and Finance	1	0
3	Ministry of Interior	4	0
4	Ministry of Public Work and Transportation	1	0
5	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports	15	1
6	Ministry of Social Affairs, Vocational Training and Youth	1	0
7	Ministry of Information	1	0
8	Ministry of Rural Development	1	0
9	The Senate	1	0
10	No answer	1974	99
Total		2000	100

C: Government office applied for 3rd member

		Frequency	Percent
1	Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports	2	0
2	No answer	1998	100
Total		2000	100

1: They asked for money? (first member)

		Frequency	Percent
1	Yes	19	1
2	No	12	1
3	No answer	1969	98
Total		2000	100

2: They asked for money? (2nd member)

		Frequency	Percent
1	Yes	3	0
2	No	1	0
3	No answer	1996	100
Total		2000	100

3: They asked for money? (3rd member)

		Frequency	Percent
1	Yes	2	0
2	No answer	1998	100
Total		2000	100

Q.458: Housing type (Record Observation)

		Frequency	Percent
1	Thatch	454	23
2	Tiles	618	31
3	Concrete	137	7
4	Galvanized iron/ aluminum	754	38
5	Salvaged materials	2	0
6	Tent	6	0
7	Mixed but predominantly made of tiles and galvanized irons	19	1
8	Mixed but predominantly made of thatch and salvaged material	9	1
9	Others	1	0
Total		2000	100

Q.459: Types of main fuel used for cooking

		Frequency	Percent
1	Fire wood	1706	85
2	Charcoal	159	8
3	Kerosene	3	0
4	Gas	124	6
5	Electricity	4	0
6	Others	4	0
Total		2000	100

Q.460: What would you say is your family's socio-economic status compared to an average family in Cambodia?

		Frequency	Percent
1	Poor	983	49
2	Not poor	46	2
4	Just on the line between poor and not poor	971	49
Total		2000	100

- **Poor:** go to Q461
- **Not Poor:** go to Q462
- **Just on the line between poor and not poor:** go to Q460

Q.461: How much would you family need for home expenses each month in order not to feel poor anymore? (IN 000 RIEL) (Open ended)**Q.462: How much would a family, of the same size as yours, which felt it was poor, need for home expenses each month in order not to feel poor anymore? (Open ended)**

Q.463: During the past year, did it ever happen that your family experienced hunger, without having anything to eat (i.e., involuntarily)? IF YES: Did it happen ONLY ONCE, A FEW TIMES, OFTEN, or ALWAYS?

		Frequency	Percent
1	It never happened	1627	81
2	Only once	81	4
3	A few times	179	9
4	Often	105	5
5	Always	8	0
Total		2000	100

HOME ASSETS:

Does your family own any of the following things?

Q.464: Motorized transport

		Frequency	Percent
1	None	1074	54
2	2 or 3 wheels	818	41
3	4 or more wheels	108	5
Total		2000	100

Q.465: Television

		Frequency	Percent
1	Yes	1124	56
2	No	876	44
Total		2000	100

Thanks!



Royal Danish Embassy
Bangkok

World Bank

Additional copies of this document are available at:

Center for Social Development
P. O. Box 1346
St. 57, No.19
Sk. Boeung Keng Kang 1
Chamkar Mon
Phnom Penh
Kingdom of Cambodia
E-Mail: csd@online.com.kh
<http://www.online.com.kh/users/csd>